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Published quarterly on the 15th of the month

Vol. XL, No. 2 June 1950

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, D.D., F.S.A.

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THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 2 JUNE VOL. XL

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The next number of the 'Modern Churchman' will be published in September and will contain Papers read at the Modern Churchmen's Conference at Bristol—

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Christian side of the 'divide' as you define it. Their estimate of the significance of Good Friday does not necessarily depend on any subsequent event in space and time, much less on any particular interpretation of any such event. They believe, with Abelard, that the purpose of the life of Jesus on earth was that God 'might illuminate the world with the light of His love and excite it to the love of Himself'; and that this, rather than belief in miracle or dogma, is what gives to Good Friday and Easter their sublime and abiding significance.

This letter was followed by a controversial correspondence between those who regard miracles as an essential factor in Christian Faith and those who do not. None of the letters, however, carries the weight of the following comment on Canon Luce's letter by Janus in the *Spectator* of April 14. Janus wrote:

> 'This broadminded recognition of the fact that the evidence for the Crucifixion and the evidence for the Resurrection are not entirely of the same order, and that many who do not hesitate to profess and call themselves Christians make some reservation about the literal acceptance of the Resurrection narratives (which are in some respects discrepant) will no doubt provoke sharp criticism. But very many will be deeply grateful to Canon Luce for his challenge to *The Times'* virtual excommunication of reverent students of the Gospels whose conclusions may be less dogmatic than *The Times'* own.'

This comment led to Canon Luce's critics hunting their quarry in the correspondence columns of the *Spectator*, which elicited a further valuable comment by Janus:

> 'It is, of course, impossible to deal in a note with the contents of these important letters. I did not understand Canon Luce (on whom I was commenting) to question the central truth of the Resurrection any more than I should, but merely to claim the right of persons seriously concerned with the Catholic faith to study earnestly the evidence as to the *manner* of the Resurrection and reach what conclusions seemed right. If they find themselves in agreement, for example, with Canon Streeter's notable essay in *Foundations*, are they to be ruled on the wrong side of the "divide" which separates Christians from non-Christians?' (*Spectator*, April 21.)

For the critical student of the Gospel of Jesus differences in the theological interpretations of the Passion and Resurrection of Jesus do not constitute the 'divide' between true and false disciples. His decisive test is: By their fruits ye shall know them. In the undoubted teaching of Jesus as preserved in the Synoptic Gospels the 'divide' for Him was between those who heard His words and did them and those who heard His words and did not do them.

The protest of Jesus, 'Why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say,' stresses this 'divide'—a 'divide' which the layman shows himself more ready to recognize than does the cleric. For it is a 'divide,' not of dogmatic confession, but of conduct and character.

The Debunking of Anglican Modernism

Canon Roger Lloyd's *The Church of England in the Twentieth Century*[1] (Vols. I and II) provides arresting reading for those

[1] *The Church of England in the Twentieth Century*, by Roger Lloyd, Canon of Winchester. Vol. I (1900 to 1918), 1946; 15*s*. Vol. II (1919 to 1939), 1950; 18*s*. 6*d*. (Longmans Green & Co.)

interested in what Augustine Birrell described as 'The troublesome History of the Church of England.' Canon Lloyd thus describes the scope and style of his contribution:

> 'This book is a portrait of a great Church in its daily life and work in a profoundly difficult epoch of its long history. It is not a history. Many years must pass before anything like a history of the Church in our own times can reasonably be attempted. It is a portrait, an impression of corporate spiritual vitality in action. Its material must therefore be highly selective.' (Vol. II, p. 24.)

Canon Roger Lloyd is not a scientific historian but an impressionist and journalist. Anyone who realizes the mass of the material at his disposal cannot fail to admire the use he makes of it, particularly in dealing with church movements and leaders and creative conferences. Nothing, considering its limitations of space, could be better done than his account of the rise and development of the Oecumenical Movement.

Here, however, we are unfortunately restricted to dealing with only one aspect of Canon Lloyd's book — his debunking of English Modernism. His headings, 'The Fundamental Failure of the Modernists,' 'the "Liberal" Heresy,' 'The Decline and Fall of Modernism,' 'Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and the Eclipse of Liberalism,' indicate the impression which the author desires to create with regard to the part played by Modernism and its final futility. It is Canon Lloyd's lack of intimate knowledge of the leading personalities of the Modernist Movement and of the many-sided membership of the Modern Churchmen's Union which accounts in some measure for his unjust presentation of it. He has had to depend too much on biographies and too little on life.

The Modern Churchmen's Union included in its membership Lord Avebury, Canon Barnett and Dame Henrietta Barnett, Bishop Whittingham, Prof. Caldecott, Canon Sanday, Mrs. Humphry Ward, Archdeacon Lilley, A. W. Hutton, Dr. Aspland, Dr. Foakes-Jackson, Kirsopp Lake, Dr. W. D. Morrison, Bishop Hamilton Baynes, Archbishop Vernet, A. J. Carlyle, Lord Charnwood, Dr. Coulton, Dick Sheppard, Eric Loveday, Dr. Macan, Dean Page, Dean Fremantle, Canon Danks, James Adderley, Studdert Kennedy, Alderman Charles Jenkinson, Percy Dearmer, Alfred Fawkes, Hubert Handley, C. R. Shaw-Stewart, Prof. Percy Gardner and Alice Gardner, Dean Rashdall, Archdeacon R. H. Charles, J. M. Creed, Canon J. M. Wilson and his son Sir Arnold Wilson, G. R. S. Mead, Sir Thomas Dyke-Acland, Sir William and Lady Ashley, Constance Maynard, Canon Garnsey, Dr. Geikie-Cobb, Canon Glazebrook, R. B. Tollinton, Canon Streeter, Sir A. W. Lawrence, Philip Bagenal,

Sir John Thompson, Sir Francis Younghusband, Canon Vernon Storr, Dr. Dougles White, Prebendary J. R. Wilkinson, Dora Nussey, Preb. Winstanley, Preb. E. P. Boys-Smith, F. C. Burkitt, Bishop Percival, Dr. Skrine, Chancellor Hoernle, Cyril Emmet, Lily Dougall, Chancellor Hall, Prof. M. A. Canney, John Gamble, Prof. Henslow, Lord Russell of Liverpool, J. E. Willett, Canon Papillon, Dean Furneaux.

But it is not by its membership but by its influence that a movement must be judged. This is recognized by Canon Roger Lloyd. He writes of the Church situation in 1912 :

> 'The situation was by now unbearably tense. A great explosion was plainly not far away. The long battle of books and pamphlets, conducted with no thought of a strategic plan, had so developed as to drive both sides into a position from which no retreat seemed possible, and the suffering and cost of which could hardly be alleviated by compromise. The modernists felt that they were struggling to fend off an imminent divorce between the intellect of Europe and the whole Catholic tradition. The divorce had already taken place on the continent. Should it also happen in Britain then the decree of *Nisi Prius* must be made absolute and final for the whole world. The modernists therefore considered themselves to be more catholic than the catholics. In a sense, so they were. Nothing could be more un-catholic than the cheerful and reckless contemplation of a cleavage between scholarship and faith, and of this recklessness the rank and file of the Anglo-Catholics were at that time certainly guilty.' (Vol. I, p. 95.)

Canon Lloyd seems to think that what was wrong with the Modernist movement was that the M.C.U. had not enough doctrinal theologians among its leaders. This is a gross misapprehension : Sanday, Rashdall, Streeter, Cyril Emmet, Burkitt, Bethune-Baker, Archdeacon Bindley, Caldecott, W. R. Matthews, Inge, Foakes-Jackson, J. M. Creed, C. F. Russell, Vernon Storr, J. W. Hunkin, R. B. Tollinton, Charles Raven, Canon Lilley represented a more solid body of English theological learning than that possessed by the combined theologians of the Anglo-Catholic and Evangelical schools.

The theological learning was there all right but it was the use the Modernists made of it which created the trouble. They strove to re-state the traditional theology and they based this re-statement on the results of modern Biblical Criticism, Comparative Religion and the Psychology of Religion. It was this which was so unacceptable to the traditionalist ecclesiastics. All might have gone well if our ecclesiastical authorities had led in this movement instead of discouraging it. Our Archbishops were tolerant but not encouraging, and other very influential bishops were strongly hostile and sought to terrorise Archbishop Davidson, not unsuccessfully. Moreover, the Primate himself was dominated in the sphere of

octrinal and liturgical reform by the motto: 'The longer it akes the better it will be.' As a consequence, doctrinal reform, hen it came, came too late. Meanwhile, multitudes were being lienated from the Church and were ceasing to be practising hurch people. As Alfred Fawkes wrote: 'Tarry ye here with ne ass and I and the lad will go yonder and worship.' Modernism etained its leaders in the Church, but a vast number of potential dherents were lost to the Church which a prompt, courageous nd sympathetic Church policy would have retained.

Nevertheless, not a little is due to English Modernism for its art in preserving the influence of the Anglican communion as a piritual and moral power in our national life to-day. What enor- nous advance has been made in the sphere of Biblical studies and ur whole conception of the origin, development, significance and haracteristics of the Scriptures. We are no longer dominated y the absurdities of the plenary verbal inspiration of Scripture, ne appalling doctrine of Hell fire, the materialist conception of ne resurrection of the flesh, the expiatory sacrifice of Christ and great number of other discarded doctrines which our forefathers egarded as essentially Christian.

The Modernists, of course, in many cases only made use of ne knowledge secured by the researches of scientists, historians, terary critics, etc. But they contended that these results should e studied and understood and utilized in the Church's acceptance nd presentation of the Christian Faith. It is to the Modernist lso that we owe the creation of the Commission that produced ne *Doctrinal Report* and thereby secured a great enlargement of octrinal freedom and teaching within the English Church. nglican efforts to secure liturgical reform in the twentieth cen- ury also owe much to Modernists, who were the first to advocate lternative uses in church worship and to issue unofficial revised ervices.

The Modernists, or Liberal Churchmen, are no isolated hurch party. Their influence outside their ranks among Anglo- atholics and Evangelicals has been very great. It is Modernist nfluence which produced *Lux Mundi* and *Essays Catholic and ritical* in Anglo-Catholicism. It was Canon Vernon Storr, a ember of the Council of the M.C.U., who founded the Anglican vangelical Group Movement which has done so much to beralise Evangelicalism.

The numbers of adherents of Modernist church societies is not rge, but the influence of Modernism in the Anglican Com- nunion is great indeed, notwithstanding the immense efforts of oman propaganda and Barthian Protestantism to discredit and

suppress it. This is why we regret that Canon Roger Lloyd has thrown his weight against English Modernism. To a number of outstanding Modernists like Alderman Charles Jenkinson, Canon Lloyd does justice; but to others, like Streeter and Rashdall, he gives far less than is their due considering the greatness of their achievements. How grotesque to write that G. K. Chesterton 'blew Rashdall's whole position to smithereens.' (Vol. I, p. 82.)

Of the notable Girton Conference of Modern Churchmen of 1921 Canon Lloyd justly writes:

> 'Nevertheless the Girton conference had one positive influence upon the development of doctrinal thought in the Church of England during this period. The storm it caused helped to change the Archbishop of Canterbury's mind; and whereas he had previously refused to appoint a Commission upon doctrine in the Church of England, he now acceded to the many requests that he should do so.' (Vol. II, p. 47.)

Looking back on the storm created by the Girton Conference in the bosoms of our traditionalist Churchmen, we recall the comment of Alfred Fawkes: 'There were they in great fear, where no fear was.'

An Anglican Bishop Blougram

The latest volume of Bishop Henson's reminiscences, just published,[2] contains the Bishop's *Confessio Fidei* in his 'open letter to a young padre' (pp. 353-384). It constitutes a significant contribution to the understanding of Dr. Henson's personality and explains, if it does not justify, his extraordinary inconsistencies which amazed and bitterly disappointed his warmest liberal friends. Perhaps the most remarkable of these inconsistencies was his tendering his Confession of Christian Faith to the Primate, Randall Davidson, to secure his consecration to the Bishopric of Hereford by asserting that he accepted every article of the Catholic Creeds *ex animo*. This phrase *ex animo* had been deliberately excised in the *Amended Subscription Act* of 1865. Professor Kirsopp Lake's sarcastic comment that Henson's *ex animo* could most truly be rendered by another Latin phrase *cum grano salis* annoyed the Bishop and undoubtedly precipitated his severance from English Modernists.

There is a passage in the Bishop's 'open letter' which explains the Bishop's mentality. He was never fundamentally a Modernist but possessed strong sympathy with the English Dissenters among whom he was brought up. He wished to see them comprehended

[2] *Retrospect of an Unimportant Life.* Volume III (1939-46). The Years of Retirement. By Herbert Hensley Henson. (O.U.P., 1950; 25*s*.)

within the Church of England. But the Modernist aim as defined by Professor Gardner was not Henson's.

> 'Modernism is based upon evolution in science and the critical method in history; and it demands, not that the great truths of the Christian religion shall be given up, but that they shall be considered afresh in the light of growing knowledge, and restated in a way suitable to the intellectual conditions of the age.'

There is nothing so radical as this in the policy of Henson, although his Modernist associates had thought he was one of them. This appears clearly in the following passage from the 'open letter.' Scrutinizing his faith in retrospect, the Bishop writes:

> 'I have often applied to myself the lines which Browning places in the mouth of Bishop Blougram:
>
> With me, faith means perpetual unbelief,
> Kept quiet, like the snake, 'neath Michael's foot,
> Who stands calm just because he feels it writhe.
>
> Even now, at the close of my long life, these lines appeal to me as a not unjust description of my spiritual state.' (p. 354.)

There are three kinds of Anglican Liberals: Rationalist Liberals, *e.g.* Hastings Rashdall; Mystical Liberals, *e.g.* R. W. Inge; and Agnostic Liberals. Henson belonged to this third class. He acknowledged the authority of Truth, but when Truth came into conflict with Tradition, he could not decide what was Truth. And Tradition therefore prevailed. In Henson's case not Rome's Tradition but Canterbury's.

In the light of Henson's agnostic confession, his desertion of the Modernists and his confession of faith to Randall Davidson may be justified. But it is more difficult to justify his subsequent attacks on his former associates. For instance, in his 'open letter' he writes:

> 'Alongside the Anglo-Catholic party there is a considerable current of Anglican opinion within the "Modernist" movement which is apparently seeking to domesticate Anglican Christianity in some eclectic scheme of theistic religion, which would facilitate religious agreement by destroying the distinctive character and exclusive claim of Christian Theism.' (p. 383.)

This is a preposterous description of the ultimate objective of the Modernist Movement in the Church of England. We know of no statement by any of its more eminent leaders which can be cited to support Dr. Henson's accusation.

Bishop Henson in his latest volume summarizes his Christian Faith in the words of St. Paul: 'God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.' We recall the same Pauline passage being cited by the first President of the Modern Churchmen's Union to express his own Christian Faith, and since then there

is no President of the M.C.U. who would not have used the same passage for the same purpose.

We have only space to refer to one further instance of Bishop Henson's extraordinary double-mindedness:

> 'I cannot believe that the Church of England can much longer avoid disruption. The extreme Anglo-Catholicks must finally find their "spiritual home" in the Papal Communion. When I contrast Bishop Lightfoot's great *Dissertation on the Christian Ministry,* published in 1868, and Bishop Kirk's essay in *The Apostolic Ministry,* published in 1946, I cannot believe that they are both reasonable interpretations of the Christian ministry, as it has been received, interpreted and illustrated in the Church of England since the Reformation, nor can I have any doubt as to which of them accords with the official standards, classical literature, and historical witness of that Church. In type, temper and tendency, Bishop Kirk's essay appears to me essentially Roman, not Anglican. But undoubtedly it expresses the mind and direction of that section of the Anglo-Catholick party which accepts the Bishop as its trusted leader. There is no future for the historic Church of England in that direction.' (p. 383.)

All Modernist Anglican scholars will assent to the soundness of Dr. Henson's judgment in this passage. But when it comes to the Bishop's practical Church policy after his secession from the English Modernists we find him becoming a strong supporter of Disestablishment and the separation of Church and State in England.

It is typical of the disappointing inconsistency of Dr. Henson's mentality that whilst professing whole-hearted loyalty to the Church of England he was unable to see that in England it is the Establishment which is the most formidable opponent both to the Romanization of the Church and to its disruption. That Romanizers and secularists should support Disestablishment, which if achieved would inevitably bring about disendowment and disruption, is entirely reasonable, but that Bishop Henson should have supported Disestablishment is amazing. If it be urged in his defence that Establishment is the main barrier which prevents the Dissenters from entering the Church of England, we not only should deny this but would maintain that if it be so the remedy is not Disestablishment and separation of Church and State, but Re-establishment on a comprehensive modern basis.

Synthesis in Religion

Bishop Hensley Henson in the last volume of his autobiography condemns strongly eclectic religion as having no permanent place within the Anglican Communion. We are not sure that in his condemnation of eclectic religion the Bishop is not including another very different religious movement—the spirit of

religious synthesis which is making great advances in the religious world of to-day and not least in the Anglican Communion, especially in that part of it which exists abroad.

Sir John Stewart-Wallace (Chairman of the Executive Committee of the World Congress of Faiths) thus describes it in an arresting article in the April *Hibbert Journal*:

> 'The great cosmic process is confused with an attempt to make some superficial eclectic religion, like the synthetic products of war-time, planned at some politically-inspired, hierarchical conference, where a formula of compromise is sought, as though the Things of the Spirit could be bandied about as the politicians bandy the slogans of their politics. It is as if it were proposed to snatch away the ark of the covenant, or other most holy symbol of the Faith, with all its beauty, sacredness and inspiring fire, and put nothing of comfort, light, life and love in its place.
>
> 'Nothing could be further from what is meant by synthesis in religion. It is altogether different from a synthesis of religions in the plural. The one is a cosmic process. The other would be a man-made sacrilege. The very suggestion comes as a shock to the religious soul. It would violate the simple faith of the millions of trusting souls to whom their particular faith and its symbols are the most precious possession in their lives. Of such a synthesis there is no suggestion. What is meant is that beyond all the symbols, forms, creeds and theologies a great unity in deepest essence exists. It is to be persuaded that all non-essentials shrink into nothingness when in highest faith, hope and charity our eyes are opened to the fundamental unity of all true spiritual experience — the depths where all theologies cease. It is to hold the salvation, enlightenment, illumination, communion with the *One*, beyond all anthropomorphic conception or definition, has been and will be vouchsafed to every seeking soul who by the dedicated life of prayer, humility and dying to self has fitted himself to receive it — and that irrespective of the particular creed in which for him is hidden the Universal to which the particular is but a path. Behind and above all the World Faiths there is to-day, here and now, a transcendent *oneness*, a Fellowship of the Spirit, of which the world, breaking from the swaddling clothes of the institutional theologies, is becoming conscious. . . . Christian theology cannot escape the process, though we may hold the faith that the Spirit of the Sermon on the Mount will, world without end, remain supreme. (*Hibbert Journal*, p. 250 f.)

A good example of this Modernist religious synthesis which is going on in the contemporary world is furnished by the following letter of Lord Sinha published in *The Times* of May 1, 1950:

> Sir, — Your recent leading article revealing the inner meaning of Easter carried a message farther than to the Christian peoples; for in drawing attention to the necessity for a spiritual revival, it gave the call of the hour to the rest of humanity against the dangers of materialism, godlessness, and the forces of evil that are germane in them. Quite apart from any religious reconciliation between the dogmas of the Church of Christ and the Muslims, I have been struck by the sincerity and the timely urgency of an international movement (with eight foreign branches) called the Moslem Union, which has successfully projected its programme from Paris, and now from London, for a *rapprochement*

between the Christians and Muslims. This movement also draws attention to another calculated to help the cause of peace among nations, called the One World Movement. In regard to the former, it is heartening to note that the Christian response has been most encouraging, and the voices of Muslim kings have also been added to those of the rank and file of the Muslim world.

Like my revered father, the late Lord Sinha, who numbered among his closest friends both Christians and Muslims, I am entirely non-party and non-communal; but, like him, I can see the tremendous spiritual forces that such a movement as the Moslem Union has created for good and the peace of the world; and its strength cannot be exaggerated, for it is spreading fast from China to West Africa to defeat the nefarious march westward of unspirituality. Am I to remind the people of this country of the heritage of their fathers to fight evil wherever they may find it, and to assist a worthy endeavour and stem the tide of that which is abhorrent to the liberal conscience of mankind?

WILLIAM WORDSWORTH

1770—1850

By Canon M. T. Dunlop, M.A.

POETRY, though optimistically addressed to us common men by the greater poets, and even humbly by Wordsworth, is hieratical, a mystery with which we may have communion, but only on its terms. It is an illumination, and therefore, while it must seek to win us, to be what Thomas Browne called 'a medicine of cherries,' it remains a discipline. In the controversial preface to the *Lyrical Ballads* Wordsworth dismisses those poets 'who think they are conferring honour upon themselves and their art in proportion as they separate themselves from the sympathies of men.' He sets his sail squarely to the wind of delight, concerned to give 'that sort of pleasure and that quantity of pleasure which a poet may rationally endeavour to impart.' Nevertheless Wordsworth's primary business is to 'describe objects and utter sentiments, of such a nature, and in such a connection with each other, that the understanding of the reader must necessarily be in some degree enlightened, and his affection strengthened and purified.' In a word, and his own, the poet's search is 'to discover what is really important to men.'

Wordsworth was under no illusion that his course would be universally popular. 'I flattered myself that they who should be pleased with (the poems) would read them with more than common pleasure: and, on the other hand, I was well aware that by those who should dislike them, they would be read with more than common dislike.' Such is the lot of poets. They are not neutral men. Yet Wordsworth's is a special case. Few poets have been

more cordially liked or disliked than he. It was so in his own day; on the one side, the considered adoration of Coleridge, the affection of De Quincey and 'the raving Southey': on the other, the vitriolic pages of the *Edinburgh Quarterly* and the hatred of a host of parodists. How account for it? The search for an answer, though pedestrian, may bring Wordsworth into closer view.

An obvious cause of the dislike is that Wordsworth asked to be called a teacher, and was an inveterate preacher. The English are partial to neither. It is not so much that a high seriousness is native to him, as it is proper to his theme: Hardy is as serious. It is rather that Wordsworth lacks the English salt of humour and, alternatively, uses too gentle an irony.

A deeper cause lay in his political opinions, and in the change that overtook them. When the French Revolution broke out, Wordsworth

> 'was thrilled with joy,
> France standing on the top of golden hours
> And human nature seeming born again.'

He had hailed 'As best the government of equal rights and individual worth,' but he began to change his opinion of the Revolution before the *Prelude* was finished, that is by 1805. Frenchmen had 'become oppressors in their turn.' By 1838 he is denouncing the ballot-box in England and the Reform Act of four years earlier.

> Forth rushed from Envy sprung and Self-conceit,
> A Power misnamed the SPIRIT OF REFORM,
> And through the astonished Island swept in storm
> Threatening to lay all Orders at her feet . . .'

As a young man he outrages those for whom Burke so vehemently spoke; as an older man he is held in that bitter despite reserved for a lost leader by a new generation purged by the Byronic fires and intoxicated by Shelley. There is no doubt that Wordsworth lost his nerve; but let two things be said. The course of the Revolution, through Robespierre's thuggery to Buonaparte's tyranny, was a shattering experience for him, the gravest event of his life, and one of anguish. He was

> 'inwardly oppressed
> With sorrow, disappointment, vexing thoughts,
> Confusion of opinion, zeal decayed,
> And lastly, utter loss of hope itself. . . .'

Yet to the end he held fast to liberty, at least to 'the freedom of the individual mind,' and had the stamina to endure till he had achieved its intellectual rehabilitation for himself, though in more sober colours than at the dawn. 'You have been deluded by places and persons,' he wrote in 1821, 'while I have stuck to

principles. I abandoned France and her rulers when they abandoned liberty, gave themselves up to tyranny, and endeavoured to enslave the world.' We can appreciate this argument, for do we not have recourse to it ourselves? Secondly, he remained throughout a staunch humanitarian. In 1835 he wrote as a postscript to his poems a treatise on the Poor Law of 1834 that might have served as a preface to the Beveridge Report over a century later. He seizes unerringly on the cardinal principle of the Poor Law, that no man shall starve in England, but deplores the harshness of the application. He advances a view still regarded as extraordinary by many in 1939, that if the country cannot find work for a man it should honourably maintain him, and not cast him on charity. Later in that postscript he discusses the administration of the Church of England, foresees the intolerable financial burden to be placed on it by the growth of large industrial towns in the North, and enters a plea for a great increase in the number of curates, offering also advice on their duties, that might still be read with profit by the leaders of the Northern Province, and by its curates.

There was a still deeper cause for the odium he incurred. Wordsworth was a prophet and reformer, and in the citadel itself of sensibility and the aesthetic. His spirit, at work upon and within the poetic tradition, made it live anew for his own day, to the disturbance and fear of the traditionalists. He opened up new reaches of sensibility, personal and introspective. He retains, indeed, a certain classical reticence which we, his psychology-ridden heirs, might emulate; the *Prelude*, written privately to Coleridge, wherein Wordsworth tells of his own spiritual and poetic development and touches guardedly on the story of Marie-Anne Vallon, he withholds from publication all his life. But his own apprehensions of nature and of man, his own feelings and thoughts, these form his material: he looks into himself and speaks of what he finds. The balance of Aristotle's canon is ignored; as Wordsworth himself says, it is the feeling developed by poetry which gives importance to action and situation. He is the master-builder of the English Romantic Movement. It is only as that movement gains momentum that the big battalions come over to his side. 'Up to 1820,' wrote De Quincey in 1835, 'the name of Wordsworth was trampled under foot; from 1820 to 1830 it was militant; from 1830 it has been triumphant.' It was not only that the climate of opinion changed in Wordsworth's favour; but he himself powerfully contributed to that change. It is a measure of his greatness, and no doubt also of his weakness, that he was a chief architect of the Victorian Age.

Yet there is still something more behind both the violent antipathy and the devout partisanship which Wordsworth aroused, and arouses yet. Coleridge put his finger on it. Whatever our approach to poetry, the poems of Wordsworth, with few famous exceptions, appear to contain what is good and what is bad. Because of the defects, his admirers must defend him; because of his excellencies, his detractors, bewildered, cannot dismiss him. 'In all perplexity,' writes Coleridge, 'there is a portion of fear, which predisposes the mind to anger. Not able to deny that the author possessed both genius and a powerful intellect (the critics) felt *very positive*, but yet were not *quite certain*, that he might not be in the right, and they themselves in the wrong.' So many feel to-day when they turn from the sensuous brilliance of Epstein's busts, with their uncanny command of texture, to his stone carving of Lazarus. How can a man capable of the one have perpetrated the other? Or, frightening thought, is it that we as well as Lazarus stand in need of resurrection? Stephens' disrespectful parody ascribing two voices to Wordsworth comes near the mark. The climacteric in his life and opinions occurs about 1805, but the other voice is heard before that. Here is the first voice:

> My heart leaps up when I behold
> A rainbow in the sky:
> So was it when my life began;
> So is it now I am a man;
> So be it when I shall grow old,
> Or let me die!
> The child is father to the man;
> And I could wish my days to be
> Bound each to each by natural piety.

For the other voice, and in the same year, let us take one of the two considerable examples admitted by Coleridge. A woman is speaking of her sailor-son's pet bird:

> He to a fellow-lodger's care
> Had left it, to be watched and fed,
> Till he came back again; and there
> I found it when my son was dead;
> And now, God help me for my little wit!
> I trail it with me, Sir! he took so much delight in it.

In the later poems such banalities become more erudite, and the worse for it:

> 'Impute it not to impatience if,' exclaimed
> The Wanderer, 'I infer that he was healed
> By perseverance in the course prescribed.'

Transition passages, the low saddles of narrative between the

hills of emotion, provide one sure test of poetic genius. Wordsworth can drive us to despair:

> Poor Susan moans, poor Susan groans;
> 'As sure as there's a moon in heaven,'
> Cries Betty, 'he'll be back again;
> They'll both be here—'tis almost ten—
> Both will be here before eleven.'

The tedious detail clogs imagination:

> My horse moved on. Hoof after hoof
> He raised and never stopped . . .

Of such lines, 'I could not myself,' says Coleridge, 'find a sufficient cause for their having been recorded in metre.' But turn the pages, and the next moment we are swept off our feet by a triumph of narrative verse:

> We scampered homewards. O, ye rocks and streams,
> And that still spirit shed from evening air!
> Even in this joyous time I sometimes felt
> Your presence, when with slackened step we breathed
> Along the sides of the steep hills, or when
> Lighted by gleams of moonlight from the sea
> We beat with thundering hoofs the level sand.

But let us beware. In this matter of diction Wordsworth did all of deliberate purpose. His profoundest revelations of nature are in the easy words of common speech. He enfleshed the new spirit of the Romantic Movement in a fresh poetic language. In his preface to the *Lyrical Ballads* he abjures 'personifications' and figures of speech used as 'a mechanical device of style.' 'My purpose,' he says, 'was to imitate and adopt the very language of men.' Like all great poets, he was preoccupied with the technique of his art, and versed in its history. Here he takes hold of the first-light simplicities of Gray and Burns, so soon to be echoed by Clare on his lonely path, and makes of them a poetic revolution. The reverberations of that aesthetic explosion are still with us; the great Wordsworthian discord, so boldly struck, is far from resolved. Many of our modern poets, it is their frequent complaint, find themselves compelled to abstain 'from the use of many expressions, in themselves proper and beautiful, but which have been foolishly repeated by bad poets till such feelings of disgust are connected with them' that they are usable no more. Those words are Wordsworth's. But whereas he sought the way out in a return to the vernacular and in simplicity of diction, regarding obscurity as the fatal defect, our moderns, faced with this same perennial difficulty, make obscurity their vehicle and ride away in a cloud.

Were sincerity and simplicity the whole story, we had been spared Wordsworth in the doldrums and many of his flat-footed passages. But there was in him, beside a vigorous moral reason, an instinct to rationalize and an itch to moralize that had in them something of anxiety. When he defends his choice of language and subject-matter he tells us that he turned for both to rural life 'where the essential passions of the heart find a better soil,' where there is simplicity, and where 'the passions of men are incorporated with the beautiful and permanent forms of nature.' Coleridge dealt trenchantly with that fallacy, but in this conscious adoption of rusticity we have a pointer to an element in Wordsworth's mind. His love of the countryside is formalized into a theory. So also must he rationalize his very affection for simple folk, and apologetically in more than one passage:

> Shepherds, dwellers in the valleys, men
> Whom I already loved;—not verily
> For their own sakes, but for the fields and hills
> Where was their occupation and abode.

These and other rationalizations, extraneous to his genius as a poet, he elevates as doctrines into the kingdom of poetry itself. Here is the treacherous inspiration of Wordsworth's other voice. Too easily he is distracted into philosophisings and moralizings; too often defends his sentiment and debases the coinage of his poetry to pay Danegeld to his theories. Why, for example, use verse to condemn the first appearance of illustrated magazines? He speaks of common people in the common tongue—who better?—but often perversely obtrudes the commonplace upon us. If Wordsworth grows kinder as he grows older, certainly his vision grows vaguer, its expression looser. We are worshippers outside the rood-screen, but it is plain enough that the altar of poetry demands single-eyed service. Poetry is an independent kingdom of the spirit, its laws are aesthetic and beauty is its king.

There are other kingdoms, of love and of truth, with equal claims upon us; but here need be no clash of sovereignties.

> 'Beauty is truth, truth beauty,' that is all
> Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

Keats is surely right. In the world of the spirit a kingdom truly served can be at war with none other. As for the poet, he perceives things as they are; and things as they are hang together. It is when Wordsworth is intent on his business as a poet, his theories forgotten, that he best serves humanity. 'The principal object proposed in these poems,' he writes in that same preface, 'was to choose incidents and situations from common life.' 'I

have wished to keep the Reader in the company of flesh and blood, persuaded that by so doing I shall interest him.' In turning his back upon the heroic, and the grand manner, Wordsworth anticipates in poetry, and by some seventy years, the slow change that has come over history, begun by John Richard Green and flowering most recently in Professor Trevelyan's *Social History*. Of course poetry before Wordsworth had dealt in the personal and intimate, though usually by types, but perhaps never since Chaucer and not excepting Shakespeare, had any poet till Wordsworth concerned himself so seriously and consistently with those common personalities which most of us are. The sailor and his mother, the little girl, the shepherd—and not your courtier's idyllic shepherd—the vicar, the emigrant mother, the idiot boy, these and their multitudinous like make his inspiration. By the power of his poetic passion, fifty years before Marx and infinitely more effectively, he destroys the Lower Orders, those objects of penal repression or Hogarthian disgust, to discover, not a proletariat, but men and women. He throws over them and their humdrum doings and sufferings 'a certain colouring of the imagination,' 'above all—tracing in them, truly but not ostentatiously, the primary laws of our nature.' His political views apart, it is by this exercise of his proper poetic faculty that Wordsworth ranks as one of the great liberators of England. After him, a labouring man or a country girl is no longer a stage super in a drama of high life, but a human being whose date

> Measured by what we are and ought to be,
> Measured by all that, trembling, we foresee,
> Is not so long!

A century and half before his time, Wordsworth is the prophet of the common man.

Wordsworth the poet drew this prophetic strength in the last analysis, not from religion or zeal for social betterment, but from Nature. For him, it was the tumbling brook that brought exaltation:

> It seems the eternal soul is clothed in thee
> With purer robes than those of flesh and blood.

In his great period he was deeply conscious of this source of his inner life. He tells us that in his early days

> The sounding cataract
> Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock,
> The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
> Their colours and their forms, were then to me
> An appetite; a feeling and a love . . .

Later he had

> a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns. . . .

But this something is still Nature of the five senses. He finds

> In nature and the language of the sense
> The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
> The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
> Of all my moral being.

At the height of his powers it is an identification with Nature wherein he lives

> one interior life
> In which all beings live with God, themselves
> Are God, existing in the mighty whole,
> As indistinguishable as the cloudless east
> Is from the cloudless west. . . .[1]

Yet it is here, in the inner chamber of his poetry, that the two voices grew most distinct. Now the rationalization is Christian orthodoxy. He who had seen a new-born child trailing clouds of glory could come to write:

> Dear be the Church that, watching o'er the needs
> Of Infancy, provides a timely shower
> Whose virtue changes to a Christian Flower
> A Growth from sinful Nature's bed of weeds.

After 1805, when the *Prelude* was completed, this other so-called Christian voice increasingly takes command. Professor de Selincourt has shown how the manuscript of the *Prelude* itself was cut and amended in the interests of orthodoxy. There is a profound change of attitude. He who had felt as his soul bade him, came to feel, observe and ponder 'as piety ordained.'

What shall we say, then? Shall we stick our labels, marked Pantheism, on the finest of Wordsworth's poetry and relegate it to the *Index*? Let us have a care. The Churchmen whose orthodoxies mesmerised Wordsworth were those same who soon were to attempt the stifling of Darwin and the breaking of Bishop Colenso. Already the seed was germinating of that baneful tree of unreason beneath whose shadow the Church and the Christian religion have withered in our land. Before we apply the petty measuring rod of some desiccated orthodoxy to a mind of the stature that created the *Prelude*, let us hesitate, lest we it is who are not thinking straight, lest after all he is right and we the

[1] Quoted by Prof. de Selincourt from a fragment of M.S.

carping heretics. To seek for reconciliation between Wordsworth's vision of Nature and the Church's vision of God is to misconceive both. Our God is not to be neatly vivisected by a formulary; but He is the Lord God, who shall be worshipped in truth; and in love; and in the beauty of holiness.

If we would save our generation, let us lift up our eyes from our endless assemblies and committees elaborating their bloodless compromises on issues of spiritual life or death. Let us lift them up again to the hills of humanity and reason which adorn the country of English poetry. Theology must return as the Queen of the Sciences if ever we are to regain peace of mind. But so long as our civilization and culture last, and their term is doubtful, theology cannot be restored as absolute monarch. She must needs return as a constitutional queen whose kingdom shall be comprised of self-governing dominions — of philosophy and science, of history and politics, of mathematics and the arts. When that new kingdom comes, poetry will be one dominion. In it Wordsworth shall have a glorious place, and it will be with his clearer voice that he sings creation's praise. Let us reverence him now. In our busy and trivial world, if we are to survive for the men we are, room must be found for him whose life's work is to contemplate life.

Wordsworth, man and poet, resembled the Lakes where he dwelt. There are the prosy marshes of the estuary and the flats of the littoral, plains which yet disclose such a sudden secret beauty as Wast Water; there are the softly shaded valleys of the pastoral lyrics; and there are the rock-hard soaring peaks of imagination lit by passion. The supreme maker of the English Romantic Movement; an architect of the Victorian Age; a smith whose fires forged a new poetic language; a liberator; a child of earth and the amanuensis of Nature: Wordsworth is all these, and something more. Let the last word be with Coleridge again. 'His proper title is, *Spectator ab extra.*'

VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA*

By W. R. Matthews, D.D., D.Litt., K.C.V.O., Dean of St. Paul's

THE proposal to legalise, under stringent conditions, voluntary euthanasia has called forth much criticism from Christians. We ought not to be surprised at this, because the sacredness of human life and personality is a fundamental tenet of the Christian faith. Some of its earliest battles against paganism were fought against customs which presupposed that human lives could rightly be disposed of according to the convenience or pleasure of the State, or of some other human institution, such as the family. From the first the Church stood against the exposure of unwanted babies and against gladiatorial shows, in which human lives were sacrificed for the amusement of the populace. The racial theories and practices of the Nazis remind us that this emphasis on the sacredness of human personality is needed to-day, and I should like to make it quite clear that I have no sympathy whatever with any design either to breed or to destroy human beings for some purpose of the State. I hold firmly the doctrine of the sacredness of human personality.

When a Christian first hears of the proposal to legalise voluntary euthanasia he naturally thinks that it is a dangerous one, because it may weaken, or even seem to contradict, the principle of the sacredness of human personality. That was my own primary reaction and, therefore, I wish to treat opponents of voluntary euthanasia with respect and to recognise that they have a case. I have come, however, to believe that they are mistaken, and I will try to state briefly the reasons which have caused me to change my mind.

It seems plain to me that the principle of the sacredness of human personality cannot be stretched to cover the case of those whom the proposed legislation has in mind. We have to present to ourselves the condition of a man who is incurably ill and destined to a period of agonising suffering, relieved only by the administration of narcotic drugs. The situation then, in many instances, is that a disintegration of the personality occurs. Nothing could be more distressing than to observe the gradual degeneration of a fine and firm character into something which we hardly recognise as our friend, as the result of physical causes and of the means adopted to assuage intolerable pain. It is contended that the endurance of suffering may be a means of grace and no Christian

* Address at Annual Meeting of the Society for the Legalisation of Voluntary Euthanasia. May 2nd, 1950.

would deny this, but I would urge that, in the case of a man whose existence is a continuous drugged dream, this cannot be alleged.

Though we must readily agree that endurance of suffering in the right spirit may be a means of grace for the deepening of the spiritual life, we are bound to hold that, in itself, suffering is evil. If it were not so, how could it be a duty to relieve it as far as we are able? We should all revolt against a person who complacently regarded the suffering of someone else as a 'blessing in disguise' and refused to do anything about it on those grounds. It seems to be an incontrovertible proposition that, when we are confronted with suffering which is wholly destructive in its consequences and, so far as we can see, could have no beneficial result, there is a *prima facie* duty to bring it to an end.

We sometimes hear it said that voluntary euthanasia is an attempt to interfere with the providential order of the world and to cut short the allotted span of life. It seems to be assumed by those who argue in this way that God has assigned to each one a definite number of days — 'the term of his natural life'— and that to take any measures to reduce this number must in all circumstances be wrong. But we must observe that this argument would cut both ways and would equally condemn any attempt to lengthen the term. All medical treatment, which after all is an interference with the natural processes, would be wrong, on this assumption, and many of us who are alive now because doctors have saved our lives have really no right to continue to exist in this world. Surely this view of the providential order is not the true one. Worked out to its logical conclusion it would lead to intolerable absurdities and even to the doctrine that every human effort to lengthen life or improve its conditions is to be reprobated as contrary to the will of God.

No one is really prepared to act on this assumption. I suggest that a truer view of the providential order would be as follows: The Creator has given man reason, freedom and conscience and has left him with the possibility of ordering his own life within limits. He is to do the best he can with the material presented to him; and that means that it is the will of God that we should use our reason and conscience and our power to choose when we are faced with evils that have a remedy. My view of Providence then leads me to suppose that we are required by our belief in God to give the most earnest consideration to the proposal to legalise voluntary euthanasia. We are not at liberty to dismiss it on some preconceived prejudice.

The less reflective critics of voluntary euthanasia allege that it would be legalised murder, or suicide, or both. But surely before

we fling these ugly words about we should be careful to enquire what we mean by them. The act of the suicide is wrong because he takes his own life solely on his own judgment. It may be that he does so in a mood of despair or remorse and thus evades the responsibility of doing what he can to repair the wrong or improve the situation. He flings away his life when there is still the possibility of service and when there are still duties to be done. The proposals for Voluntary Euthanasia have nothing in common with suicide. They take the decision out of the hands of the individual. The case is submitted to the objective judgment of doctors and specially appointed officials whose duty it would be to enquire whether the conditions which constitute the sinfulness of suicide are present or not.

Murder consists in taking of the life of another person with deliberate intention, 'with malice aforethought.' Very few people are prepared to take the command, 'Thou shalt not kill' as universally applicable and admitting no exceptions. If we did so we should all have to be vegetarians. But supposing the command to apply only to human life, we can all imagine circumstances in which it would be a duty to kill. For example, if an innocent person is being murderously assaulted and there is no other way of defending him, we ought to try to kill the assailant. The suggestion that voluntary euthanasia under the proposed regulations is murder seems to me absurd. The life which is abbreviated is one which the patient ardently wishes to resign; there is no malice in the hearts of those who co-operate, but rather love and compassion, and the community is not deprived of any valuable service. None of the conditions which constitute the sin of murder are present in voluntary euthanasia as proposed in the bill advocated by the Society.

I suppose that something must be said in reply to those who deprecate the raising of this distasteful subject and would prefer to leave things as they are. 'Why not leave it to the doctor?' they cry, imagining — I do not know with what justification — that doctors often take measures to shorten the suffering of the hopelessly ill. This attitude appears to me to be really immoral, because it is an excuse for shuffling off responsibility. By what right do we place this terrible burden on the individual doctor? We have to remember that, as the law stands at present, if he does not do all he can to preserve the tortured life up to the last possible gasp, he renders himself liable to grave penalties — even perhaps to the charge of murder. Is this a position in which one's conscience can be easy? No: there is no honourable way of dealing with the question except by making up our minds whether

or not voluntary euthanasia under proper safeguards is ethically justifiable and, if we decide that it is, embodying that conclusion in the law. Moreover, if the legitimacy of properly safeguarded euthanasia is accepted, every sufferer *in extremis* and in severe pain has a right to be able to choose it. It is unjust that he should depend upon the views of the doctor who happens to attend him.

I have met the argument that we can never be certain that any illness is incurable; that 'while there is life there is hope.' It is of course true that we hear of remarkable recoveries which confound the diagnosis of the physician. I do not disregard the potentialities of 'spiritual healing' nor would I exclude even the possibility of miracle, but I do not see how anyone who has had any experience of visiting the sick can question the proposition that there are cases where nothing but a miracle could restore the patient or stave off his dissolution within a brief period, and where nothing but useless agony can be anticipated. We cannot regulate our conduct at all unless we assume that it must be guided by the knowledge that we have. We take for granted that known causes will be followed by known effects in the overwhelming majority of cases. Any other assumption would strike at the roots of sanity.

'New occasions teach new duties.' The advance of medical science has changed the conditions of human life. It is true that the ultimate principles of Christian morals do not change. The root of all Christian morality is the injunction to love God and our neighbour; as St. Paul says, 'love is the fulfilling of the law.' But though fundamental principles do not change, their application may differ as the needs of the time require. Rules which were once valid and useful may become obsolete and even an obstacle to the true 'fulfilling of the law.' We must beware lest, in holding fast to 'the letter,' we betray the 'spirit.' In my belief it is the vocation of the Christian to be alert to see where the law of love would point out to us 'new duties.' The great master-principle of love and its child compassion should, I urge, impel us to support the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia as advocated by this Society.

THE SCIENTIST SPEAKS

By J. C. Hardwick

IN these two recently published volumes, *An Autobiography* and *The Nature of the Universe*,* we have a distinguished octogenarian anatomist and anthropologist telling the story of his life, and a young Cambridge mathematician informing us of the latest astronomical theories of the origin and nature of the physical universe. Needless to say, both books, though so different in character, are highly interesting.

The most fascinating part of Sir Arthur Keith's book is the story he tells of his boyhood and youth. As he himself says, a halo of romance hangs round it all, and this account of an Aberdeenshire farming family of the 'seventies of the last century is not only delightful to read but is also a valuable social document giving a vivid picture of a kind of life which now, unfortunately, lies in the past, and has been replaced by something far less rich in human values. It has been said that in a biography the mean years are always the most interesting, and though his boyhood was very happy, Sir Arthur had some difficult times after he had qualified before he got his foot on the ladder. His industry and determination were phenomenal, characteristic no doubt of his ancestry and his nation. As a student, human anatomy, which he studied under one of the leading anatomists of his day, Professor John Struthers, fascinated him. 'He it was,' writes Sir Arthur, 'who opened the Darwinian gates for me,' and the prize awarded to the young student at the end of his first year by Struthers was the sixth edition of *The Origin of Species*. He also acquired as a prize Tylor's *Anthropology*.

His first professional post was one of assistant in a mental hospital, and here he first began to make a special study of the physiology of the human brain. Later, he took a post for three years in Siam, and there he did numerous dissections on monkeys, comparing the variations in structure among them with parallel variations in the human body, hoping thereby to satisfy his old longing to find further proof of the Darwinian theory of man's origin. On his return to England he set himself to attain the qualifications of M.D. and F.R.C.S., which objectives he reached after two years of intensely hard work. Later, his researches in the anatomy of the human brain, and his knowledge of its bony integument, led him to take an intimate interest of the fossilised remains of man's

* Sir Arthur Keith, *An Autobiography*. (Watts; 25*s*.)
Fred Hoyle, *The Nature of the Universe*. (Basil Blackwell; 5*s*.)

very early ancestors, whether human or subhuman. Sir Arthur, through his specialized knowledge, was perhaps better able than any other anthropologist to reconstruct a skull from fragments of fossilised bone. The discovery in Java by Dubois of the fossilised remains of what might seem to be a 'missing link' between ape and man, and later of the Piltdown skull, provided material for speculation about the antiquity of man and involved Sir Arthur in considerable controversy.

What will especially interest many readers of this Autobiography are the indications therein of the distinguished author's religious opinions and their development. There is every indication that as a boy and a young man he was completely satisfied with the religious tradition in which he had been reared. He came of a sound religious stock. His paternal grandfather, though an indifferent farmer, 'was strong in all matters of religion, even saying grace over a drink from a wayside well.' His father also was a religious man, though his religion 'was rather of the intellectual than of the emotional sort: he found himself in a world which supplied him with evidence of divine creation.' Of his mother's religion Sir Arthur writes that it was 'of the warm-hearted, emotional, evangelical kind: God was Love; religion was loving — these were her basal tenets.' He regularly attended church while an undergraduate at Aberdeen, nor was the habit discontinued when he took up his abode in London for purposes of study after his return from abroad. Some hints, however, are given by Sir Arthur in his Conway Lecture of 1925, later published by the R.P.A. as a small book, *The Religion of a Darwinist*. In referring to this in the *Autobiography* he remarks that no doubt his absorption of Darwin's teaching had led to a gradual 'moulting' of the beliefs in which he had been brought up. 'So gradual was the process that I could not say when it began nor when it ended.' But much stronger than the Darwinian influence was one which 'bore in upon me as I came to have a deeper knowledge of how the brain works.'

> 'Our knowledge of that organ is still far from complete, but when I became a teacher of Anatomy it was sufficient to permit me to realize that what we spoke of as "mind," "soul," and "spirit" were manifestations of the activity of a living brain. When the brain ceases to live, these manifestations also cease. I had become a materialist without realizing the fact.'

In his Ludwig Mond Lecture at Manchester in 1928 Sir Arthur's plain expression of these views gave offence in some quarters.

> 'Medical men,' he declared, 'can find no grounds for believing that the brain is a dual organ — a compound of spirit and substance. Every

fact known to them compels the inference that mind, spirit, soul are manifestations of the living brain, just as flame is the manifestation of a burning candle. At the moment of extinction both flame and spirit cease to have a separate or individual existence.'

After remarking that this utterance led to a sharp slump of his stock in the market of public opinion, and that he was cut dead at the Athenaeum by one noble Lord, while at a Cambridge meeting of psysiologists he was given 'a very cool reception,' Sir Arthur says, 'Even Charles Sherrington seemed to think I had been telling tales out of school.' The observation suggests that Sir Charles was of his opinion, while regretting that this opinion had been too bluntly expressed. But as is generally known, Sir Charles Sherrington, the distinguished neurologist, holds other views on this matter, as he has indicated not only in a foreword to a reprint of his classical work on the Nervous System, but also in his more recent *Man on his Nature* (1941).'[1]

[1] In the former he writes: 'That our being should consist of *two* fundamental elements offers, I suppose, no greater inherent improbability than that it should rest on one only.' He has felt obliged to declare that 'we have to regard the relation of mind to brain as still not merely unsolved, but still devoid of a basis for the very beginning of a solution.' These quotations may be found in Viscount Samuel's recent *Creative Man.*

To admit an insoluble duality as Sherrington feels compelled to do evidently would appear unreasonable to Sir Arthur Keith on the ground that *entia non sunt multiplicanda, i.e.* that it complicates a simple problem, and that to reduce an *apparent* duality to a unity is a more scientific procedure. And of the two apparent components it is mind rather than matter which must be dismissed, as mind cannot be perceived, whereas matter can. The philosopher, however, would probably urge that we cannot understand matter apart from some understanding of mind, or at least what contribution our minds and senses make to the 'material' world. Moreover, it may be urged that Sir Arthur's analogy—as flame is to candle, so is mind to living brain—is an imperfect one and therefore misleading. For flame and candle, though so different in appearance, are composed of like material, and are indeed two forms of one thing, namely carbon, in the one case incandescent, and in the other untouched by combustion. But to regard Mind and Brain as two forms of one substance is hardly permissible, and if permitted would beg the whole question.

Sir Arthur became a member of the Rationalist Press Association and contributed frequently to its publications, for he 'found that Rationalists welcomed the truths of evolution more readily than any other body of laymen.' In contrast to this he felt that there still existed 'a large and vocal section of the public,

especially in nonconformist circles, which disliked Darwinism in all its aspects and maintained that its scientific foundations had crumbled.' It was for this reason that he chose as his subject for his presidential address to the British Association at Leeds in 1927 'Darwin's Theory of Man's Origin as it Stands To-day.' The Association attended the Parish Church on the Sunday to hear a sermon by the newly appointed Bishop of Ripon, Dr. E. Arthur Burroughs, on the relations of Religion and Science, touching on some of the problems raised by Sir Arthur's address. Some enterprsing journalists sought to embroil him in controversy with the Bishop, but he recognized that the two of them were at one in being truth-seekers, and issued a statement in the Press :

> 'The Bishop of Ripon and the Vicar of Leeds did me the honour of coming to hear my much-criticized address, and I went to the Parish Church and listened to the Bishop's much-debated and much-misunderstood sermon, and found we were both trying to do the same thing — to understand and explain the kind of universe of which man is part, and to perceive what man's rightful place in the universe really is. Far from being roused into antagonism, I listened with close attention. How could it be otherwise when the preacher touched upon vital issues with rare skill and earnestness — an earnestness which was touched with the saving grace of humour? We can debate these things : why should we quarrel over them? '

If one were to attempt to define Sir Arthur Keith's attitude in one word it would be that Latin word *pietas*, which one supposes might be translated by the English word 'reverence.' In the case of Sir Arthur, reverence primarily for truth and for the memory of the great man whom he held to be the embodiment of that ideal of scientific truth — Charles Darwin. At the Leeds meeting above referred to Sir Arthur made a plea for the preservation of Darwin's home at Downe, with the result that Sir Buckstone Browne provided the means, as also funds for a biological research station to be built near by. That Downe House, where Darwin wrote his books and brought up his family, is now open to the public and in the possession of the British Association is thus due, in the first instance, to the *pietas* of Sir Arthur Keith. It is fitting that he should now be living within a stone's throw of the house, holding the office of Master of the Farm, *i.e.* of the research station which was the munificent gift of Sir Buckstone Browne to the Royal College of Surgeons.

Of the validity of Mr. Hoyle's astronomical theories set forth with such attractive lucidity in his B.B.C. lectures and in this reissue of them in a small volume of 120 pages, the present reviewer is not competent to pronounce. What will interest the general reader most, perhaps, will be the two points made by

Mr. Hoyle, (1) that a considerable proportion of the millions of stars which make up our own and other galaxies may have planets capable of supporting life, and (2) that the universe of galaxies is composed primarily of hydrogen and that the supply of hydrogen is perpetually being renewed.

> 'From time to time people ask where the created material comes from. Well, it does not come from anywhere. Material simply appears — it is created. At one time the various atoms composing the material do not exist, and at a later time they do. This may seem a very strange idea and I agree that it is, but in science it does not matter how strange an idea may seem so long as it works — that is to say, so long as the idea can be expressed in a precise form and so long as its consequences are found to be in agreement with observation.'

The publisher's 'blurb' to Mr. Hoyle's book tells us that the author 'dislikes modern art, modern music, philosophy, bridge and cats.' One feels that to be 'allergic' to the first two is excusable if not actually commendable, but for an astronomer to have a distaste for philosophy seems regrettable, since it may lead him into error. Though unlike many who have no use for philosophy, Mr. Hoyle uncompromisingly rejects materialism, which he rightly says is not simple (as it seems) but 'really very complicated.'

Turning to the cosmology of the Bible, while admitting that it is 'a remarkable conception, considering the time when it was written,' Mr. Hoyle thinks it can hardly be denied that it is 'only the merest daub compared with the sweeping grandeur of the picture revealed by modern science.' The 'three-storey' universe of the Hebrews does indeed seem rather tiny compared with a vast host of galactic systems; but, primitive as it was, it inspired poets like the author of the 104th Psalm, the *Book of Job*, and certain chapters of *Isaiah*. We still await the poet who will sing the praises of a vast globe of incandescent gas, or of incredible spaces filled with diffused hydrogen. But no doubt the time will come.

But his depreciation of Hebrew cosmology leads Mr. Hoyle to a reflection with which we find it difficult to concur.

> 'Is it in any way reasonable,' he asks, 'to suppose that it was given to the Hebrews to understand mysteries far deeper than anything I can comprehend, when it is quite clear that they were completely ignorant of many matters that seem commonplace to me?'

Here the contention would seem to be that the world had to wait for the full development of the natural sciences before it could attain to the highest moral and spiritual truths. The fact that the ancient Hebrews and Greeks possessed no modern equipment either in the way of telescopes or higher mathematics limited their

knowledge of the universe; but this handicap cannot be thought to have limited their sensitiveness and perceptiveness in other spheres — in the spheres of moral and spiritual truth in the case of the Hebrews, and in that of aesthetic truth in the case of the Greeks. We feel that on further reflection Mr. Hoyle will revise this wholly Philistine opinion.

But in view of the above it is hardly surprising to find Mr. Hoyle classing religion among the inutilities. It is 'a blind attempt to find an escape from the truly dreadful situation in which we find ourselves.' It is indeed a sign of grace in Mr. Hoyle that, like Pascal before him, he is appalled by the vast spaces 'which I know not and which know not me.' We recommend the *Pensées* to Mr. Hoyle, for they put size and bigness into their place — which is pretty low down in the evolutionary scale.

The situation is 'dreadful' because 'here we are in this wholly fantastic universe with scarcely a clue as to whether our existence has any real significance.' It has significance to ourselves, no doubt; and yet why should we regard the human species as being of any importance in the scheme of things? A thing can only have significance for a mind, and if there be no mind beyond the human, the human race cannot possibly have any significance save for itself. The universe is 'fantastic' because it is mindless. Primitive as it was, the Hebrew universe was rational because there was a Mind at the back of it. Which kind of universe would we prefer to inhabit? The 'daub' or the grand picture which freezes us with the indifference of death?

If reality be as is pictured it is not surprising that we look round for means of escape. One of these 'blind attempts to escape' would be a belief in some continued existence of the individual after death. Mr. Hoyle's position in this matter is the same as that of Sir Arthur Keith's, though with his Cambridge scientific training he realizes that you cannot dogmatize about mind or anything else until you have some clear understanding of what it is. To make any progress in this question of survival 'it is necessary to understand what our minds are.' 'If we knew this with any precision then I have no doubt that we should be well on the way to getting a satisfactory answer. But at the moment we have only the vaguest ideas on this.' Mr. Hoyle does, however, consider it clear that mind 'must have some physical connections,' and this, he says, involves the corollary that 'if the something we call mind does survive after death then this something must be capable of physical detection.' This would seem to be more or less the position of the spiritualists, with their interest in levitation, 'materializations,' etc.

It is indeed the case that mind in our experience is invariably connected with a body; but assuming the reality of mind (*i.e.* assuming that it is not just an 'epiphenomenon' or something of that sort), no one at present understands the nature of that connection — so Sir Charles Sherrington avers. So it is not really possible to say with any certainty that such connection is essential to the existence of mind. Also, if it be the case that we are wholly dependent upon our physical senses for perceiving or detecting the presence of anything, our failure to detect the presence of mind apart from its physical connections may be due to limitations in our power to detect the non-physical rather than to mind's absence or non-existence. It does not seem to follow that our failure to detect the presence of a non-physical entity like mind is sure evidence of its non-existence. It would seem to be the case that mind 'stands apart from the energy-system embracing star, rose, and dog which we call Nature,' and is really in the strict sense of the word supernatural. We in our bodies, as Sir Charles Sherrington says, are the link between the two—mind and the perceived world. 'We are the tie between them. Perhaps we exist for that.'

Mr. Hoyle devotes half a page to a discussion of the Christian doctrine of immortality, of which he displays an imperfect knowledge. He writes of it as if it taught an indefinite prolongation of our present existence with all its painful limitations and frustrations. Here again he approximates to the views of the spiritualists. That would indeed be, as he remarks, a 'horrible alternative' to extinction at death.

> 'What the Christians offer me is an eternity of frustration. And it is no good their trying to mitigate the situation by saying that sooner or later my limitations would be removed, because that could not be done without altering *me*. It strikes me as very curious that the Christians have so little to say about how they propose eternity should be spent.'

But is it not possible to alter the *ego* without destroying identity? Surely this is what happens in the case of every growing organism. Mr. Hoyle, who is now thirty-five, has altered, in some respects, we may presume, since he was fifteen; and he will alter, we may hope, yet further as the years pass. It may be that when he attains the present age of Sir Arthur Keith he will write his own autobiography and describe those processes of change. He will by then have realized, with Newman, that 'To live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.'

It is indeed true that little is said by Christian authorities, from the New Testament writers onwards, as to how eternity is to be spent. But that is because Eternity is not spent at all. One

spends time as one spends money, because both, by their very nature, come to an end, or are capable of doing so. All that is quantitative has its limit. If mind is capable of existing apart from its physical connections (or even apart from its *present* physical connections), it will not be involved in time at all, because time, like space, is one of those physical connections — or rather, it is bound up with them because the physical world presents itself to us as existing in time and in space.

Of course the trouble is that this world of time and space — the 'fantastic' universe of galaxies with its inconceivably vast tracts and deserts of both — is Mr. Hoyle's real world, and the only reality. The rest is mirage. That is why the whole thing seems to him appalling, as indeed it is — mindless, vast and indifferent. Not cruel, because to be cruel you have to have *intention*.

But it does not seem to occur to Mr. Hoyle that time, apart from a sentient being to experience it, is meaningless. Or that space is a purely relative conception — that if our galaxy shrank to the size of a dinner-plate no one could possibly perceive the change since everything would shrink in proportion. And anyway, from the point of view of a single electron a dinner-plate is perhaps not unlike a universe.

It is certainly not necessary that everyone should study metaphysics. But that the study should be pursued by some seems desirable, if only, as F. H. Bradley put it, because there is no other certain way of protecting ourselves against dogmatic superstition. And it is not only the superstitions associated with religion that we have to be on our guard against, but also the superstitions associated with science. And of the two it may be that the latter sort are the more dangerous at the present time, if only because the scientific expert to-day speaks loudly *ex cathedra*, whereas the theologian can only speak with bowed head and in a whisper.

Experimental science in alliance with a mechanistic philosophy of Nature presents us with some sinister possibilites. It cannot be denied that there is 'a potential *hubris* inherent in scientific pursuits,' and 'the new *ecclesia* of technology' is already finding 'its consummate triumph by bringing to their explosive fusion the iciest mathematical abstractions and the hot appetite for power.'[2] The priesthood of the new *ecclesia* is but the old priesthood writ large, and we should beware of its claim to infallibility.

[2] Dr. Erich Heller in an article 'Goethe and the Idea of Scientific Truth' in *The Cambridge Journal*, May 1950.

THE MYSTICISM OF EMILY BRONTË

By the Rev. J. A. Bramley, R.N.

'MYSTICISM,' we are told by no less an authority than Dr. Inge, 'means communion with God.' He goes on to say that, if what the mystics tell us of their experience is true — if they have really been in communion with the Holy Spirit of God — then that is a fact of overwhelming importance to religion. And, we might add, especially in the present age of unbelief, when Faith waxes cold and the traditional props that once gave it support are now ignored or discredited or altogether thrown down.

Emily Brontë, the second of the three surviving Brontë sisters, was born in the year 1818, two years after her sister Charlotte. Her outer life was uneventful; and considering how close to us she is in time and the fact that her eldest sister was a famous novelist and a prolific letter writer, it is strange how inscrutable she still appears and how the strange riddle of her personality remains hidden from us.

The little we know of her outer life is revealing, although it is in her poems and her one tremendous novel that we must look if we wish to catch glimpses here and there of her extraordinary mind. For, like all true mystics, she lived 'inwardly,' and only in her works are we likely to find revealed to us hints of that inner and secret life which, in life as in death, she succeeded in guarding so zealously.

The Brontë sisters were only one generation removed from Irish peasantry on their father's side; and it seemed that Emily had all the peasant's love of the soil and of the place where she had grown up. But there was also a strongly practical side to her, since we know that she was a good hand at the housework, did most of the cooking, the household ironing, and made all the bread for the family. No doubt she had learnt early, like other mystics, that the mystical vision was more apt to reveal itself against an ordinary dull background of sober routine and work.

For the rest, we know that she had a passion for music, and played Mozart and Hadyn on Charlotte's little piano with precision and brilliance. M. Héger tells us she was gifted with a powerful intellect and if she had been a man would have made a great navigator or discoverer. And from Ellen Nussey, a friend of the family, we learn that, though her reserve was impenetrable, yet she was intensely lovable and invited confidence in her moral power. 'Few people have the gift of looking and smiling as she

could look and smile. One of her rare expressive looks was something to remember through life. There was a depth of soul and feeling and yet a shyness of revealing herself. . . .'

She, like her sisters, wrote both prose and poetry from a comparatively early age. And one would expect to find in one so attuned to the wild setting of the moors round Haworth in which she had been brought up, that her first efforts would express something of that nature mysticism which we find, for instance, in the poetry of Wordsworth and Tennyson. In a poem written in her teens we find such verses as this:

Awaken, o'er all my dear moorland
West Wind, in thy glory and pride!
Oh! call me from valley and lowland
To walk by the hill-torrent's side!

A little later, in a poem addressed to someone who might well be herself, we find a deeper and more intimate sense of communion with nature being expressed:

And thou art now a spirit pouring
Thy presence into all:
The essence of the tempest's roaring
And of the tempest's fall.

But there was another side to Emily's genius which early revealed itself. She, who loved liberty above all things, became aware of the clogging chains of the flesh. She felt at times that the fleshy tenement in which her soul was housed was little better than a dungeon or tomb:

Weaned from life and torn away
In the morning of thy day,
Bound in everlasting gloom,
Buried in a hopeless tomb.

But there is nothing escapist in the mysticism of Emily Brontë. Unlike Wordsworth or Traherne, she did not 'avert her eyes from half of human fate.' Although her experience of life was so limited she knew all about the existence of evil, because she found it in herself. In a poem written when she was nineteen she complains:

'Twas grief enough to think mankind
All hollow, servile, insincere,
But worse to trust to my own mind
And find the same corruption there.

And this acute awareness of the existence of the two opposing principles of good and evil presently caused an overwhelming conflict in her own breast, which she describes thus powerfully:

So stood I in Heaven's glorious sun
And in the glare of hell.
My spirit drank a mingled tone

Of seraph's song and demon's groan —
What my soul bore my soul alone
Within itself may tell.

Both in her verse and her one solitary stupendous novel we find this awareness of evil — this Satanism embodied and expressed. In the latter it is embodied in the terrible character of Heathcliff, who is a fiend, a demon, a denizen of the infernal regions, but only *because* and *while* he is separated from his true affinity, Catherine Earnshaw. *Wuthering Heights* is a spiritual drama of affinity and immortality — such are the grand twin themes of this unique book. And when the conclusion is reached, and the little crying boy trying to drive two sheep and a lamb before him meets, after they are dead, 'Heathcliff and a woman yonder, under t'nab,' we know that their living souls are joined together at last, and they have found that peace and joy in the hereafter which they could never find while they were prisoners of the flesh.

She must have descended at times, too, into that state known of mystics as the dark night of the soul, when the shadows descended and she felt utterly cut off from the Divine Radiance:

Had I but seen his glorious eye
Once light the clouds that wilder me,
I ne'er had raised this coward cry
To cease to think and cease to be.

On the other hand, she uses the language of love in one of her most glorious poems to tell us exactly what the mystical vision meant to her:

No later light has lightened up my heaven,
No second morning ever shone for me;
All my life's bliss from thy dear life was given,
All my life's bliss is in the grave with thee.

Then gradually we find her making more daring flights of the spirit, which at the same time impelled her muse to soar on even bolder wings. In *The Prisoner* she gives us a unique description of the mystic's rapture as he is caught up into the seventh heaven, and of the pangs that accompany the return to the cramping and mundane conditions of the flesh:

Then dawns the Invisible; the Unseen it's truth reveals;
My outward sense is gone, my inward essence feels:
It's wings are almost free — it's home, it's harbour found,
Measuring the gulf, it stoops and dares the final bound.

Oh! dreadful is the check — intense the agony —
When the ear begins to hear, and the eye begins to see;
When the pulse begins to throb, the brain to think again;
The soul to feel the flesh, and the flesh to feel the chain.

Finally, in her *Last Lines*, published after her death, she gave us that marvellous poem — that too-bold dying song which shook like a trumpet-blast the soul of Matthew Arnold — in which she embodied in immortal words the Faith that had been revealed to her:

No coward soul is mine,
No trembler in the world's storm-troubled sphere
I see Heaven's glories shine,
And faith shines equal, arming me from fear.

O God within my breast,
Almighty, ever-present Deity!
Life — that in me has rest,
As I — undying Life — have power in thee!

Vain are the thousand creeds
That move men's hearts: unutterably vain;
Worthless as withered weeds,
Or idlest froth amid the boundless main.

To waken doubt in one
Holding so fast by thine infinity;
So surely anchored on
The steadfast rock of immortality.

With wide-embracing love
Thy spirit animates eternal years,
Pervades and broods above,
Changes, sustains, dissolves, creates, and rears.

It expresses a profound and unshakable faith in language commensurate with the tremendous spiritual experience embodied in the poem. The nature of the faith is possibly pre-Christian, though no doubt Emily Brontë's mysticism owed a great deal to the fact that her father was a clergyman and she was brought up against a background of religious orthodoxy. But to say that her mysticism was pre-Christian is not to say that it was un-Christian. There is a similarity in the experiences of mystics of all faiths, since they all are seeking to reach direct and unaided the same goal. Nor can we admit in the last resort any dualism between natural and revealed religion. Emily Brontë's religion was as natural as that of St. Joan, but it had also been revealed to her from an outside source. And we, who live in this latter part of time, when faith seems to be growing as cold as the moon, and authority and dogma as barren as the mountains that are visible on it, can only gratefully marvel at this young lonely untutored genius of the Yorkshire moors, who saw the glories of heaven shining, and captured for us in immortal words a living throb of its Divine Heart.

ISOLATIONISM *VERSUS* WORLD COMMUNITY

ADDRESSED to Christians,* by Dr. F. H. Ross, is described by its publishers as a 'fighting' book, and so it is. Dr. Ross is not one to conceal his intentions or tone down his conclusions. And in the short space of only one hundred and fifty-four pages he has defined, historically traced, and vigorously probed into the causes and effects of our present religious dilemma. That, whatever else it may be, is decidedly a major intellectual undertaking. And it can be said with practical certainty that no reader of *The Modern Churchman* will be disappointed at the result. Disagreements there can and will be. The book is a tract, a profound reading of the signs of the times, and not a documented dissertation designed to display the author's wide range of learning. It aims at 'shaking up' the complacency of Western Christians, whatever their denominational tie, and the instruments adopted for that end will open many an old wound. Such experience is always painful, but Dr. Ross's method is not designed to conceal from his readers the full gravity of their plight. This is not to say that his argument is couched in terms which are disturbing just for the sake of being disturbing. Behind every paragraph there is constructive thinking originating, as he tells us, in his experience as a teacher of Church History as well as of non-Christian religions. There would be little point in publishing another book which merely pointed to the 'all too human' failings of the Christian Church throughout her history. Most Christians, even the most rigidly traditionalist, are at least in part aware of these. Dr. Ross is primarily concerned with setting these failings in a context which may help to delineate sharply their basic causes. The sub-title of the book, *Isolationism vs. World Community*, strikes the key-note for this analysis. The author is interested in the problem of the Christian tendency to religious provincialism in its contemporary setting: a world which technology has rendered One and in which all provincialisms can only lead to catastrophe. There is nothing particularly new in his brief survey of Christian history, but in each section, from the primitive Church to the present day, there runs the thematic question: Did the Church at this point foster conditions which might contribute to and not frustrate the full demands of man's spiritual, rational and social nature? As the history approaches our own time the question becomes urgent. For within an almost unbelievably short period

* *Addressed to Christians: Isolationism vs. World Community*, by Floyd H. Ross. (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1950; pp. 154; $2.00.)

of time our technologically-created One-World has become a world of several great religious traditions, each somewhat embarrassed at the existence of its competitors.

> Man's loyalties are tied to communities or groupings that are no longer isolated from other community-loyalties as they once were to a high degree. Most of our present loyalties seem to be exhausted in family, clan, tribe, race, class, nation, or religion. Even the 'savior cults'—both secular and religious—have proved ineffective stepping-stones to a sense of universal community. All of our presently held community-loyalties seem too local in scope and too limited in imagination to provide a basis for taking those steps that might lead to a genuine sense of world community.

The author is convinced that until such loyalties are somehow transcended in favour of a higher principle of essential human interdependence, no real universal community can be established. Furthermore, we can place little faith in many of the traditional Christian proposals for its establishment:

> The study of history does not make one very hopeful that human reunion can ever be effectively accomplished under tribal symbols which are held tenaciously by a portion of humanity and imposed coercively upon some other portion of the race.

This is forcefully demonstrated in the history of the early Christian community itself. For example,

> The history of the Petrine fellowship should serve as a constant reminder that it is dangerous to assume that God's plan for the race, or the route which mankind will follow into world community, will necessarily unfold in terms, symbols, or theologies treasured most earnestly by ourselves.

Throughout his analysis, Dr. Ross's tacit guiding principle is that even the Christian community must be willing to lose its life in order to save it, and that we must all (no matter what our particular 'party' affiliation) be ever willing to see our own smaller interests broken and humbled for the sake of continued personal and community spiritual growth. There is something terribly ironic about the fact that Christians need to be propagandized into accepting this attitude—the very attitude which was at the core of so much of our Lord's teaching. Our failure, he asserts, has been primarily one of idolatry, of refusing to admit the transitoriness of all human verbalisations of God's will and Man's relation to it.

> All theologies are earthborn even though they speak of matters of more than temporal significance. They are precipitated in the ebb and flow of the affairs of men and always bear with them marks of their origin. . . .
>
> The value of any symbol, technique, or term is its capacity to point beyond itself. If a symbol does not do that, it becomes an idol.

Dr. Ross's account of the subtle interests and processes behind creed-making are brilliantly drawn.

> The process of creed-making, like the process of education itself, would go on indefinitely in normal exploratory fashion were it not for the fact that in every historically conscious movement, administratively-minded persons step forward to 'jell' the process, to determine what the conditions of membership shall be and what the 'faith' shall be. In some such fashion churches or parties are formed, and indoctrination tends to displace the more subtle factors in the process of education or self-actualization.

The course of the author's argument is illuminated by countless brief observations, completely disarming in their ability to uncover the root problems in their simplest terms.

> A revelation which retains something of its vitality because it continues to speak to the experiences of actual persons in many differing situations is still relative. Absoluteness is not demonstrated by longevity.

With reference to the limitations of the Reformers he writes:

> To rebel emotionally against one's past is not to transcend it but is to bind oneself to it by inversion. Rebellion can become an occasion of growth but is never growth itself.

And when he comes to the current tendencies of neo-Protestantism, which would deny not only all natural theology but even all relevance of 'non-Biblical' inspiration, he says:

> If the Christian religion seeks to persist in the tradition indicated by Barth and his closest followers or sympathizers, it will die from feeding on itself.

He sums up the Catholic position thus:

> Stated briefly, the unwritten Roman assumption on which their cumulative argument is based is that God would not have been God had He not set up a definite institution for the salvation of man and made it quite clear what the conditions were for such salvation as well as who should administer details.

Dr. Ross himself finds more than adequate reason to suppose that this sort of 'definition' of God falls seriously short of doing justice to the obvious facts. The opposition is always one of externalism *vs.* spirituality, of clinging *vs.* abandonment to God's will, of finality *vs.* the on-going process of exploration and education. He contrasts two fundamental religious attitudes, one which would seek at every opportunity to *exclude* those who refuse to multify their life in the Spirit, and the other which everywhere looks for ways to *include* all who are pilgrims in the same quest.

> The only finality of any movement or church lies in its ability to transform all of its historical manifestations into terms of universally available values or meanings. This means, concretely, an ever-enlarging

capacity for community. Dogmatic interpretations of history—definitions of creed—almost always eventuate in the process of exclusion becoming victorious over the process of inclusion.

Perhaps the most valuable part of this book is its incisive treatment, already partially indicated, of religious symbols, their use and abuse. Based on this analysis, the author frames a careful distinction between 'beliefs' and 'religion':

> To believe *in* beliefs or *in* religion is not the same as believing in God. For he who truly believes in God, or is grasped by a grace or a meaning which lifts him out of his old self into a more meaningful life, finds himself continually relinquishing the beliefs which he has acquired from past experience. A belief is like a boat—it is of value only if it enables us to continue onward in our spiritual pilgrimage. Like the boat that is left behind at the farther shore of the stream which one has found necessary to cross, a belief is laid aside as unduly cumbersome when it has served its purpose. A new instrument must be utilized for the next step ahead. . . . Beliefs held without reason or examination are seldom a mark of spiritual maturity, more often they are the measure of our lack of *faith*. If God be the ultimate meaning in the totality of mankind's experience, then God must be made evident to some degree in man's mind as well as in his heart or glands or bloodstream.

We shall not take time here to deal with Dr. Ross's concluding, and in many ways his most important, chapter, 'The Religious Principle and World Community,' wherein he sets forth pointers, suggestions as to how Christians may help and not hinder religious growth and genuine spiritual maturity. Indicative of the tone of this chapter is a sentence from Dean Inge which Dr. Ross quotes as an example of the kind of thinking necessary:

> Supposing they worship a Being with the same attributes it does not very much matter whether they call him Buddha or Christ. We must look to things rather than to words.

H. E. Root

THE IMMATURITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING DEMOCRACY

PART II

By Kenneth Henderson, M.A., B.Litt. (Oxon.), Supervisor of Religious Broadcasts, Sydney

Dangers of Party Politics

IN Britain and Australia, party lines have been formed roughly representing the 'two nations' of Disraeli — the rich and the poor. The situation in either country is now not so simple as that. But it still remains true that the bulk of people in certain occupations traditionally associated with relative riches vote in one way, and most people in certain occupations traditionally associated with relative poverty vote against them. Administrative brains have been more highly rewarded than manual skill and than dangerous and repellent services. Hence, up till recent years, these distinctions of party were roughly between mental and manual workers. It was, of course, an inevitable stage in the evolution of community that the 'masses' of the industrial revolution should rebel, become vocal and powerful, and claim a larger share of the total income.

It is a moral miracle that this revolution so far should have been carried out in the main peaceably within the framework of democratic agreements, and its effective voice should have been discussion carried on in terms of moral justice, respect for personality and economic practicability, even when and where that discussion voices a real clash of interests. In estimating our possibilities of moral progress, it is important not to underestimate the moral wonders that have been achieved. Time's revenges have brought an immense flattening of income, a transfer of controls to the State, and the creation of a huge intermediate class between the traditional groups of employers and employed. The sense of strangeness between classes is lessening. But the feeling of hardness that belongs to a conflict between two different kinds of people remains. It is fear that gives their hard, intractable edges to party lines. The strength of sin in the body politic, and the sting of death, in its intellect and spirit, is fear. It is the fear-inspired group quarrel that limits and enslaves the self. And these fears turn into threats against each other the social theories and proposed patterns of social relationships which each political party puts forward.

I believe that the mutual threatening of Individualism and Socialism — or Freedom and Solicitude — is a phase that is passing, but because of the vested interests of emotion it will pass hard. The real threat to democracy, and the people with power to implement the threat, is to be found in the pressure-group rather than in the political parties who must mature to meet that challenge.

Fear in Party Politics

The party system discloses certain democratic weaknesses into which the pressure-group can strike. The working habits hereinafter mentioned are weaknesses in that (*a*) they are apt to restrict the range of assent to particular laws and decisions arrived at through the party system working in democracy; (*b*) they weaken the sense of allegiance to lawful demands, as such, in the minds of many people, and diminish the fervour and strength of moral conviction by which they are ready to defend democratic processes; (*c*) they make it harder for different kinds of people to 'see' each other, and more difficult for citizens to make political decisions with understanding of the situation in its wholeness, with regard for the community as a whole, and with foresight. The process of political maturity is the process of remedying these weaknesses.

Discussion or Self-Interest?

The high theory of democracy is that it is government by free discussion of issues, the decision to be given by the citizen and/or his representatives according to their conception of what is right and just and expedient for the good life together. Because, plainly, this is not the whole truth, we are apt to assume that there is no truth in it. The accusers of democracy say that, in effect, the electors' decisions as to the trend of legislation, and the politicians' decisions as to details, are not wholly determined by high debate on right and reason, but also by a clash of interests made vocal. They point out that in British democracy the conflict is roughly between those with more and less wealth, with a large indeterminate class of mobile allegiance lying in between. The discussion — so the indictment runs — is a rationalizing of interests primarily selfish. The conflict is a power struggle for the right to divide spoils according to the interests of the successful group.

There is, of course, a hard core of truth in this. But no hard and fast line can be drawn between self-interest made vocal and high debate on moral principles or social well-being. Where there

is a real or apparent clash of interests, it is well that this should freely voice itself in discussion — or it will find its expression in force — and it is significant that political parties take persuasive discussion very seriously, and usually conduct it in terms of morality by appeals to principles and universal considerations. Even this moral sincerity in degree is powerful for the gaining of political assent. Legislation, too obviously restricted in consideration of group or party interest, always raises the difficulty of securing general obedience.

Misuse of Moral Indignation

In the constant appeal of the party politician to moral indignation and moral principle, there may be often a large mixture of that 'tribute which vice pays to virtue'—which is hypocrisy—a vice which has to be pushed down into the unconscious to function *ex animo*. And undoubtedly the vocabulary of moral indignation is greatly overworked in political debate. Moral indignation is too often made the excuse for refusing the effort to understand complex facts. But the constant appeal to moral indignation and virtuous aspiration does indicate that at least some degree of moral conflict is happening in the minds of most voters, and that many votes do register the outcomes of such conflicts. But it must be remembered that, in this excessive use of moral indignation, members are projecting their own sense of guilt on to their opponents, and concealing from themselves their own tendencies to aggression.

Very damaging consequences do follow from the excessive use in party politics of moral indignation coupled with the appeal to fear. The convention that almost everything that one's political opponents do or want to do is morally wrong, unjust, selfish, narrowly conceived, inhibits the faithful party member from ever taking a direct objective look at the facts with which the political situation is concerned. It is a habit that prevents the rank and file appreciating the complexity of fact, consequence and motive that go into the political judgments of most normal people. And, as we have seen, political judgments and decisions made by party leaders must have regard to the interests of all those who share in the activities that they cover, if these decisions are not to 'boomerang' and injure members of the party from which they originate. Excessive moral indignation is a peculiarly subtle form of political demoralization, for it conceals infectious centres of guilty feeling under the hard skin of self-righteousness. Moreover, the habit of estimating one's political rivals through a haze of moral indignation makes co-operation between political opponents

very difficult when occasion arises in which a great danger may break through this lack of co-operation, and in normal times it detracts from the generality and heartiness of assent on which laws finally depend for effectiveness.

This weakening of democratic assent is dangerous when an external enemy threatens in war, and unity of mind and effort is called for to repel attack. But it is dangerous also in these days, when the hard-pointed thrust of a pressure-group may endanger constitutional government, and force on rival democratic parties the need to reinforce rather than weaken each other's authority. At such a moment, the fate of democracy is the answer to the question whether political rivals for power, who strive for power within a common agreement, can put first their common agreement. This agreement is that constitutional democratic government best serves the needs of personal freedom and the good life together. Political parties are constantly tempted to ally themselves with pressure-groups. The politician who prepares, threatens, or appeals to the fear of violence if his opponents defeat him electorally is already ruling by violence.

Awareness of Danger

The only way to protect democracy against the dangers of party government is for a democracy to realise how precarious and dangerous a form of government party government is. Those in power instinctively make it their first aim to stay in power; those out of power their first aim to achieve power. It is this small word 'first' that contains the danger to democracy. It is easy to rationalize an instinctive thrust into a claim to moral righteousness and the good of all. But unless the political parties in a democracy can keep their will-to-power in subjection to the uniting agreements of democracy, and work within them, the days of that democracy are numbered, the numbers running up to the crisis which turns constitutional democracy into the one-party state. The temptation to press disagreement to extremes that are morally and psychologically destructive is only one example of the way in which the unreconciled quarrel threatens our civilization. It is urgent to awaken this background sense of inner danger in those managing our disagreements.

We have seen that party government, as it works in the English-speaking countries, is the best means so far evolved of enlisting the assent and participation of the 'little man' without letting him come too dangerously near the controls. In the United States, with its separation of executive from legislature, its local traditions, and its frequent elections, the 'little man,' with his

local interests and his mood-of-the-moment, is allowed nearer the controls than in British democracies. But in all modern democracies certain concessions must be made to his 'littleness' that Plato would not approve. National or world questions must be translated to him in terms of local and personal interests. Of course, wide-ranging decisions, political decisions, if they are sound and lasting in their validity, should sooner or later benefit most people in most places. But there is the constant temptation to 'over-play' the force and immediacy of local reaction. It is the short-term effect that touches the feelings and imagination of the 'little man,' and falls within his insight into cause and effect. 'The second-hand of the watch is the symbol of the modern man's understanding of time' says Ortega Y Gasset. So questions of world peace and long-term reconstruction must be decided in regions of fact where the judgments of the little man are hazy, uncertain, frightened, impatient and unreliable.

Leadership and the 'Little Man'

Mass judgments must be simple, but not simple are the chains of fact whereby distant events make differences in the life of the 'plain man.' The housewife who judges by the number of eggs or shirts that the weekly wage will buy is bewildered and distrustful of attempts to explain to her how these things are affected by America's foreign policy or Europe's economic troubles, or the attitude of labour to incentives. It is more emotionally satisfactory to blame the politician, and to hold him responsible for the readjustment. Hence, one of the severest strains that the party system throws on democracy is the tension within the political party between responsible leaders and the rank and file.

Party leaders, or, for that matter, leaders of trade unions or employers' federations, must deal with a range of facts much wider than those facts which make up the private lives of their followers. To keep things going, the leader must consider a range and variety of interests beyond those which are real to his follower. He must make concessions, compromises, adjustments, perhaps retreats, out of keeping with the simplicity of party slogans. Hence, very often the party leader who cannot carry his party with him is made dangerously rigid in the face of crisis. He is inhibited from making the necessary adjustments, or else he must risk splitting the party.

A democratic leader is chosen by virtue of his success in persuading the plain man of his oneness with the 'little' man. But this oneness need not necessarily reside in the quality of 'littleness.' True it is that the 'little man' may become suspicious and

resentful of a wide difference in intellectual range, or emotional disparity, but, on the other hand, he may be proud and trustful of his leader on that account, shocking to the cynical as that may seem. The real and genuine bond, sensed in a man of the type of Lincoln, is love — ability to transmit love — that is the quality which works through respect, sympathy, consideration, desire to help. A leader who can persuade his followers that thus he regards them can retain his differences of speech, manner, dress — almost his spats. But, for all that, the democratic leader must be under a constant temptation to showmanship, an itch to chase cheers that becomes intense at the moment of tension just when realism beckons towards complex and qualified thinking, and wisdom would throw a strain on the relation between leader and follower.

It has been the saving quality of democracy in Anglo-Saxon countries that the great man has nearly always been able to command a working majority in crisis, but that does not entitle us to predict that it will always be so. Each occasion is a separate risk. All the social and political tragedies of mankind could have been averted in their worst consequences if leadership in the time of crisis had gone to wise men having the power to be hard.

Machinery and Leadership

Party leaders in English-speaking democracy have usually been able to lift their parties to the level of thought, feeling and action necessary to deal successfully with a sharply defined major crisis before that crisis has visited the country with the full and final penalties of failure to meet it. The cost of the transition from 'littleness' to adequacy is usually terrible. This is most clearly demonstrated in war — the American Civil War, and the two World Wars, for example. But the fundamental danger to democratic leadership, and a constant factor depressing the quality, efficiency and authority of the democratic way of life, is found in the fact that, during the dull periods between elections, the control of party machinery is left to 'little men' who are good at that kind of thing. They are the motor-mechanics of power. They are on the spot when the main-engines have to give all that they have got. To drop that metaphor, these local functionaries, unless they allow themselves to be overborne by party leaders, choose the candidates 'in their own image,' and set the 'line of talk' by the rules of local party expediency to enlist 'little people' languidly interested. The agony of events for reflection, new initiative, magnanimity, foresight — the calls that

would disorganize the set patterns of party conflict — these they do not hear until they take on the sound of things breaking. Then such calls burst across party lines.

The tendency of political parties to be led from behind the scenes loses to national leadership almost a whole type of individuals of talent and integrity who are unwilling to submit themselves to the men who take care of the party machinery. The person who wants to make the best possible job of the facts as they come will always be at odds with the more rigid, static and mentally conservative demands of party discipline and party disciplinarians. Some measure of discipline a party needs to preserve its distinctive aims, indentity and effectiveness in carrying out a policy that holds together. Every party must beware of that degree of discipline that costs the personalities necessary to renew its life.

'Littleness' as Mortal Sin

The constant threat to the life of democracy and the continual lessening of its health comes in the main to-day not from the seats of the mighty, but from the moral and mental 'littleness' of the little man. That 'littleness' characterizes the individual limited in circumstances, interests, responsibilities and education. In this sin of 'littleness,' which is both mortal and 'original,' are to be discovered the origin of this century's wars and depressions. It is the 'little man' who flies for security to hag-ridden nationalism and totalitarian dictatorships. It is the 'littleness of the 'little man' that the showmanship of a Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin exploits; it is the littleness of the 'little man' that panics governments into prohibitive tariffs and exchange controls; the littleness of the 'little man' that sets up all kinds of reactions that make political discussion the intensification of 'littleness' — the degrading of the press, the lowering of the standard of political debate, the eliminating of the thinker and 'thinking aloud' from public affairs. The pressure-group, with its appeal to the immediate material interest, its short-term demands, its emotional force generated by the physical association of multitudes, its sanctions of limited loyalty, is the perfect instrument of the 'little man.'

'Littleness' in its political and social significance is not merely a negative deficiency. In the mind of the 'little man' personal aims — for security, material improvement, personal consideration — when they cannot be satisfied by the efforts of himself or his group become neuroses; from his unsatisfied 'littleness'

proceeds fears, angers, jealousies, mob-mindedness and other forms of destructiveness.

The maturing of democracy, and of party government as the instrument of democracy, must proceed through the moral and intellectual enlargement of the 'little man.' He must first be made more of an individual and more of a personality.

To-day every nation is a theatre of man's struggle to live his chosen life within an integrated society and to create an international society that will secure his life. The success of this agonizing requires that most of the members of our would-be civilizations should be capable of more than instinctive and automatic reaction to what they see and hear and feel around them from moment to moment. We must begin with the paradox that the closer integrating of the human society requires of men and women that they should be larger and freer as individuals — less the creatures of their immediate environment, less dominated by their private immediate interests, more detached from the sway of their own particular group. It is only desires and concerns, which can be given a certain breadth of reference, that can be willingly integrated. This is the kind of freedom that makes possible the living of the good life together with the conditions made for us by science to-day.

Freedom is possible only within a community whose formative and influential personalities have attained a certain 'size.' It is useless 'dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good,' as T. S. Eliot has it. An age, whose work must be done by interlocking masses, can be saved by the revival of personality. No doctrine can dispense modern society from the need of personal redeemers. The efficient heroism of creative personalities working within their groups is necessary to leaven group antagonisms with universalizing and reconciling principles. In every self-centred human interest the beginnings of enlargement must come from individuals willing to be crucified in some degree and able competently to interpret and present their crucifixion as more than a personal ordeal and grievance. All spiritual progress must begin in the competent crucifixion of the individual. The victim must make his disability a competent statement of his principle.

The Saving Truth

While democracy lives there will always be parties. Men are, most of them, 'coined small.' They are grouped by their work and locations. In these are rooted distinctive mental habits and ways of life. Visibility is limited towards those living and working

differently. Protective militant theories tend to collect around group interests. So much Marx sees. But it is here argued that the problem of living the good life together can be resolved, not by class dictatorship, but by the enlargement of individuals, and the quality of this enlargement must be in more capacity for Objectivity, Magnanimity and Faith. These are not three truths but one Truth.

Objectivity is the capacity for taking a direct look at the facts. It requires individuality and detachment. But, on the other hand, what we see when we look into the facts depends on each man's equipment of sympathy, experience and value. Distinctions of temperament, training, experience and ideal yield distinctive insights and intuitions. Therefore Objectivity is also the willingness to receive communications from those who see things differently, willingness to listen across dividing lines. This kind of thinking must needs go on behind and above the party battle, but if it can achieve clarity and some measure of publicity in books, press and radio, it will be heard more and more 'under' the thunder of party politics, and the thunderers cannot but be influenced by the feeling that a current of quiet judgment is not quite inaudible within their tumult.

For educating the plain man in Objectivity the most powerful means is the presenting of news. 'The undoctored incident that actually occurred' must be told. News comment brings explanation and valuation. Valuing takes us beyond pure Objectivity, but the interests of reconciliation will be served if the values applied are the universal values, and the news is presented as triumph or defeat for goodness, compassion, justice, truthfulness.

All virtue depends on education for its 'largeness.' In the school the intelligent teacher of history can especially help towards Objectivity, and some day it will be possible to give the young enough knowledge of psychology, individual and social, to give them some understanding of the currents of emotion that swirl in and around them.

In political life itself Objectivity could be increased in power by two methods within reach. The first of these is the use of inter-parliamentary committees to discuss measures in detail before they come into the arena of public debate. In such non-public proceedings real communication could pass between men of different but relevant fields of experience. The second, much discussed of late, is the setting up of permanent standing commissions covering the community's main activities. To such bodies everyone would have public access who had a reasonable

story to tell or suggestion to make. It would be the duty of such bodies to present Parliament every six months or so with the current position objectively described. The existence of such bodies of objective fact would be a powerful 'control' on the whirling tendency of political debate. Parliament itself could be made more of an agency of real discussion if governments left more questions more open to discussion, and did not feel so rigidly constrained to resign whenever they did not get the whole of their own way.

But Objectivity is not enough. Its results are important in that they provide material for Magnanimity. I use that word 'Magnanimity' to suggest size. It is Love in the New Testament sense — consideration, sympathy, desire to help — transposed to a large scale, and active beyond intimate personal contacts. It is loving at long range. It is the 'seeing' and 'sympathizing with' alien groups. It is the means whereby people in different groupings see each other as real people. It is the energy of long-range Objectivity which brings to it people in their condition to help.

Before Objectivity and Magnanimity can issue in acts of will, before they can cross the established frontiers between parties and classes, and 'start something,' they must be joined by Faith. By Faith I mean a realism deeper than an instinctive reaction to surrounding circumstances. Our cyclic feuds produce realisms of their own, systems of habits and calculations whereby we reply in kind — but more so — to the treatment which we receive or expect. But there is another Realism which believes that the fundamental Creativity in human affairs has the character of Love. This Love—manifest in respect, sympathy, helpfulness—is Energetic Law of adamantine hardness. Co-operate, and it blesses; Defy, and it smashes. The realist of faith, in responding to the conduct of friends or enemies, responds to a Reality behind and beyond them as it were — sees them as it were in God. This realism justifies pre-reciprocated goodwill, help at long range, constructive forgiveness, persistence in the long losing battles of goodwill until the tide turns.

Abstract nouns — however rich in content — will not deliver us from the immaturity of our social and political feuds. Creative individuals, breaking through to communicate with other creative individuals, must start that. But they who would by faith maintain the political challenges of magnanimity must make tlemselves objectively efficient in political fact.

SIR ISAAC NEWTON
CONTRA SANCTUM ATHANASIUM

By The Editor

WERE Churchmen asked to name the greatest of the Christian Fathers they would undoubtedly answer, St. Athanasius of Alexandria, unless they happened to be Spaniards, when they might reply St. Augustine of Hippo.

In this article we wish to direct the attention of our readers to two small books on Athanasius. The first is a modern English translation of the *De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*[1] — the most influential of the treatises of St. Athanasius. It is one of that remarkable class of literary productions by a youth of genius, for it was certainly written before 318 A.D., when Athanasius could not have been more than 21 years old. The date of his birth was between 296 and 298.

Although the most influential exposition of the Nicene Faith as against Arianism, it was written before the rise of Arianism. By some to-day its author is acclaimed as the supreme defender of the traditional Christian Faith: by others he is acclaimed as the great Christian Modernist who by his re-statement liberated the Christian Faith from heretical traditionalism. The fact that he has come down in Church History with the superb title *Athanasius contra Mundum* (and *mundum* in this case was not the pagan world but the Christian world of the fourth century) seems to support the verdict that he was essentially a Modernist as was his great theological master, the author of the Fourth Gospel.

The Introduction by C. S. Lewis to this new translation provides delightful reading and exhibits this brilliant teacher of English literature at his best. The thesis of this Introduction, a counsel of perfection, is thus set forth:

> 'It is a good rule, after reading a new book, never to allow yourself another new one till you have read an old one in between. If that is too much for you, you should at least read one old one to every three new ones.' (p. 6.)

The English translation, which definitely aims at making the treatise attractive to the modern reader, is by a member of the Wantage Sisterhood and achieves its purpose so far as this is possible. The translation is introduced by a sensitively sympathetic Preface and portrait of the Saint. She concludes her portrait of Athanasius with a number of citations from the eulogy of him by Gregory of Nazianzus, his loyal supporter:

[1] *The Incarnation of the Word of God.* Being the Treatise of St. Athanasius, *De Incarnatione Verbi Dei.* Newly translated by A Religious of C.S.M.V., St. Th. With an Introduction by C. S. Lewis. (The Centenary Press, 1950; 5*s*.)

> 'He was sublime in action, lowly in mind; inaccessible in virtue, most accessible in intercourse; gentle, free from anger, sympathetic, sweet in words, sweeter in disposition; angelic in appearance, more angelic in mind; calm in rebuke, persuasive in praise, without spoiling the good effect of either by excess, but rebuking with the tenderness of a father, praising with the dignity of a ruler.' (p. 23.)

Our second volume concerning Athanasius is of a very different kind.[2] Probably few who know what science owes to Sir Isaac Newton realize the intensity of the astronomer's interest in the Christian Religion. He bequeathed to his heirs manuscripts, most of them in his own handwriting running into over a million words, dealing with the most varied religious problems: dogmatic theology, New Testament textual criticism, Church history and the interpretation and fulfilment of prophecy. Very little of what he left behind him in the religious field has been published. He was well aware that had it been published in his lifetime it would have involved him in long and painful religious controversy for which he had neither the time nor the inclination, for his themes were controversial and his treatment of them critical. This treatment necessitated the asking of carefully phrased questions after the manner of a Counsel for the prosecution, and so are not the kind of questions in favour with traditional 'orthodoxy.' As a consequence, Newton, like his intimate friend John Locke, did not escape being suspected of 'infidelity.' This was partly due to Newton's critical interest in the theology and personal character of 'the pillar of orthodoxy,' St. Athanasius. Of the personal character of St. Athanasius, Newton took a most unfavourable view and held him to be guilty of 'the falsification of records.'

Of the theological controversies in which Athanasius was the leading figure, Newton shows himself to be as incisive a critic as was the historian Gibbon. Gibbon, however, treated the Nicene controversy with contempt, declaring it to be a controversy about an *iota* (*homoousios versus homoiousios*)—in this Gibbon displayed lack of true insight. Newton, on the other hand, recognized the importance of the controversy but despised its methods and not least its orthodox leader.

What has brought this archaic theological controversy before the British public to-day is, curiously enough, due to our great Cambridge economist, Lord Keynes.

The causes which have led to the publication of *Sir Isaac Newton: Theological Manuscripts* (1950) by the Hibbert Trustees are stated as follows in the Introduction to the volume:

[2] *Sir Isaac Newton, Theological Manuscripts.* Selected and edited with a footnote by H. McLachlan, M.A., D.D., Litt.D. (Liverpool University Press, 1950; 7*s.* 6*d.*)

'"In July, 1936, at the sale of the Newton Papers by order of Viscount Lymington, Lord Keynes, we are told, attended the sale in person, and bought about forty lots, but this was only a fraction of his ultimate acquisition from this collection." He managed gradually to reassemble about half of the collection, including the whole of the biographical portion, that is the "Conduitt Papers."

'Lord Keynes died 21 April, 1946. In July that year at the Tercentenary Celebrations by the Royal Society (published 1947), a lecture on "Newton, The Man," which Keynes had prepared before 1942, was read by his brother, Mr. Geoffrey Keynes, the distinguished surgeon and bibliographer. In the same year (1946) it was announced that Lord Keynes's library, including the Newton Collection, was bequeathed to King's College, Cambridge. Early in 1948, by kind permission of the Provost and Council of the College, the Hibbert Trustees were enabled to place a number of selected theological manuscripts on deposit for a period in the Harold Cohen Library, Liverpool University, for the purpose of examination with a view to publication.' (p. 8.)

For the modern English world Sir Isaac Newton and his religion are of much greater interest than St. Athanasius and his theology. Not that Athanasius' theology is uninteresting to modern theologians who, under the leadership of Hastings Rashdall and Charles Raven, have discovered that he was an Apolinarian and not a Chalcedonian.

But what about the religion of Isaac Newton? It was essentially Christian, essentially Biblical and essentially English: it was also very erudite and critical, but it was more. It was antipapal and very liberal. Archbishop Tenison desired Newton to be ordained, and said to him: 'You know more divinity than all of us put together.' Newton, however, declined by saying, 'I can be of more use to you as a layman.'

Newton did not take this decision because he doubted his right to be a member of the Church of England, for his conception of the Church was based upon a comprehensive Christian Liberalism derived from his study of the New Testament and the ante-Nicene Christian Church. Newton wrote in his *Thesis II*:

> 'The being of the Church doth not depend upon an uninterrupted succession of bishops and presbyters for governing her; . . . The Christian Church was also in being before there was a Christian synagogue.' (p. 41.)

Newton was an English Churchman of the school of the 'Judicious Hooker' — loyal to Church and Crown but who had no hesitation in representing the University of Cambridge in its opposition to the Romanizing policy of James II, although Charles II had by letters patent in 1675 secured Newton's right to hold the Lucasian Professorship without being ordained.

Is not this the earliest example in England of the State's liberation of modern science from the thraldom of theological dogma?

CORPORATE PRAYER and the KINGDOM OF GOD

By the Rev. Dr. C. J. Wright, St. Augustine's College, Canterbury

MY jumping-off board must be a *brochure* sent me recently and unexpectedly from Paris. It had the simple title *La Prière* and had been written by a recently deceased distinguished medical scientist, Alexis Carrel.[1] It said something important for our time. Like a wise householder the author had brought out of his treasury something old and new — the old *in a new way*. Alexis Carrel's last message to his generation was that the world to-day is suffering from a deficiency-disease due to the lack of real prayer. And — since the world is made up of individual people — that means, in varying degrees, each and every member of the whole confraternity of men and women in each and every human group, society, nation, church.

[1] Eng. tr., *Prayer* (Hodder & Stoughton). Carrel is better known to most readers by his *Man the Unknown*.

Is it, as Nietzsche said, 'a shameful thing to pray'? Is prayer a kind of superstitious instinct handed down to modern scientific man from a remote magical past? Are its alleged results as illusive and delusive as the mirage on the desert? That is the question faced by Carrel and posed by our whole present situation.

The final meaning of Prayer — of individual prayer as of what is called 'corporate' or 'collective' prayer — is that man may become a freer channel of the Divine Spirit. For while prayer *is*, in its deepest sense, the communion of the soul with God, its *end* is the furtherance of the purposes of God in His whole creation. Like every other activity of man's being it is not self-derived, self-existent, or self-ended. If it is so regarded by him who would pray, he does not truly pray. The stream running down the mountain from its spring did not originate itself, nor does it exist for itself. It flows into other streams, and the river waters the earth. All true prayer is to make men *channels* of the Spirit of God. Channels of His Spirit within individual lives. Channels of His Spirit within the immediate society in which they live and move and have their being. Channels of His Spirit within the invisible and universal society always in process of creation, in fulfilment of a transcendent, eternal purpose.

Nothing will ever again be right, or be righted, in a human society of contending States, Churches and Ideologies until there is a general return to the Source of man's life, a general acknowledgment of the Transcendent and Immanent Purpose in whose

service is perfect freedom. There is a void in the souls of people, and of peoples. That void was temporarily filled for a few years of blatant danger by splendid qualities of common sacrifice and self-forgetful endeavour. But the void remains. It cannot be otherwise when faith in the things of eternity ebbs. The thought of God has become confused and very dim. How changed is the general intellectual situation since the mediaeval period when, as Carlyle said in his Rectorial Address at Edinburgh, 'The universities began with their grand aim directed on Theology'! Could 'the knowledge of God' be justly regarded as 'the grand aim' of any modern university? I do not think men in general will ever return, either in modes of social life or of philosophical thought, to the mediaeval way. But unless they return, in their central thoughts and basic purposes, to Him who is Source, Inspirer, and Goal of all life there will continue the present drift, without rudder and compass—perhaps towards the now envisagable and compossible gulf of a common destruction.

During a most critical period of the war General Smuts was in England. On entering his plane to return to South Africa a well-known artist said to him: 'We're sorry you are going; we need you here.' 'No,' was the answer, 'you don't need me; what you need is God.' The hearts of many are *there* revealed.

In a 1948 debate in the House of Lords on the Death Penalty the Marquess of Salisbury is reported as having stated: 'There has never been a period in the last hundred and fifty years at least when there has been a more catastrophic decline in the standards of public morality.' (*The Times*, June 3, 1948.) That goes back to the end of the eighteenth century. I should have gone back two hundred years to the middle of the century, and to that period in our history of which a French observer said, 'There is no such thing as religion in England'; and of which Carlyle said, 'Soul extinct, stomach well alive.' The religious revival of that century was not unrelated to the upsurging of its mental, moral and political energies. Nor is the recent decline *unrelated* to what may not unjustly be called a catastrophic decline in public worship and in honest and truthful corporate prayer.

But how is it possible to further the 'return to God'? That is the question haunting many believing minds. Haunting also the minds of wistful and troubled 'agnostics' who are beginning to wonder whether their dogmatic negations *can* be the final word about this unfathomed universe. For while it is blasphemy to say that God *is only* what men have found him to be, it is an even more impoverishing blasphemy—indeed, a suicidal blasphemy—

to say or imply that He *is less than* what is declared in man's truest and deepest experience.

Prayer will never become again the settled attitude of men and women to life, in its privileges and duties, until some kind of integrated and dynamic faith in God and the things of eternity is born anew. 'He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.' Prayer is the unfailing test of faith. When faith burns low, prayer inevitably flickers. When philosophic conviction falters, corporate worship is stayed.

Faith, however, is deeper than credal assertion. Creed about God, Nature, Man, Eternity, issues from faith — not *vice versa.* Verbal creed is the solidified lava. It is the cairn of stones by the precipice to warn climbers. It is the beacon that points the way—but a long way that calls for the lighting of new beacons. Light is one, the beacons must be many. He who fails to light a new beacon is of the conspirators who seek to master the light (cf. *Jn.* i). Faith is the caravanserai—'we have here no abiding city.' 'What I have written now seems to me as straw,' said Thomas Aquinas after an ineffable religious experience: and he wrote no more. 'He sees not clearest who sees all things clear.' Some new expression of essential Christian faith is struggling in the womb of our indivisibly Western and Eastern times. And this 'new thing' cannot be born without Prayer. Prayer from a deeper source than what is called 'intellect'; from a source as deep, indeed, as Eternity dealing mysteriously with our human recalcitrant spirits.

Individual and Corporate Prayer. 'Corporate' prayer is not to be distinguished — save for theoretical and distorting analysis — from 'private,' 'individual' or 'personal' prayer. For all true prayer is both individual and corporate. The basic, if unrecognized, concern of this age is not the surface political and economic struggle. It is the relation of each person to the many, and the many to each person, and always within man's end and aim in the purpose of Eternity. In other words, the issue is the truth and meaning of the visible and invisible bonds uniting all created beings and things in a finally-indivisible universe.

'Christian prayer'—a phrase preferable to 'corporate prayer'—is the prayer of all who have the mind of Christ; of all who, as in His own words (for example, in *Jn.* xiv, 13 f.), 'ask in my name.' It is necessarily individual and solitary — as individual as being born, as thinking, feeling, willing, as dying ('I shall die alone,' said Pascal), or as being born anew. By virtue of what is called 'personality' men are separate — dependently separate.

Can this be without Divine meaning, or be unrelated to the furtherance and eventual consummmation of the Kingdom of God? 'There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars: for one star differeth from another star in glory' (*I Cor.* xv, 41). There is also one glory of the flowers, the trees, the birds, and lesser brethren of the fields and the forests. There is also one glory of each individual son of man in the Kingdom of God — that is, of each who shares the nature of man as God wills man to be. There is also one glory of each separate, yet mutually dependent, nation and group of nations — Western Union, Eastern Union, and what not. And so of each separate, yet mutually dependent, *ecclesia*; each receiving and giving of 'all things' — as in St. Paul's inspired expression of Christian Cosmic Catholicity in *I Cor.* iii, 21-23, 'Wherefore let no one glory in men. For all things are yours; whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are yours; And ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's.' Within the Kingdom of God all are individual sons: but each son reflects as in a mirror *the one glory of the one God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.*

Thus individual prayer and corporate (or social, collective) prayer can never, save to spurious and distorting analysis, be opposed. Because I am a member of a *koinonia*, a scholar in a school, I do not cease to be an individual. Because I am an individual I do not cease to owe, historically and psychologically, all I have and am to the community. What have we that we have not received? And what have we received that we are not called to give?

No disciple of Christ can pray as if he were solitary in a Kingdom composed of God and himself. What has been called 'individualistic prayer' is a contradiction in terms. The solitariness of prayer is an encompassed solitariness—like the individual in the orchestra, and under the conductor's control. Always there is the community of persons. When men *deny* this — in the Hebraic sense, not in the speculative sense — they are denying God. Or, to put it otherwise, self-centredness, whether in prayer or in act, is of the world, the flesh, the devil. It is sin — final sin. It is the negation of the Eternal Kingdom. 'Not my will, but thine, be done' is the all-inclusive prayer of Him who was the Kingdom incarnate: as it must be of every healed and healing, redeemed and redeeming member. 'Thus therefore shall ye pray: *Our* Father.' In prayer men are awakened by the ever-operative Spirit of God to the fact which in their unregenerate moments they deny — that all souls of this vast human family are

joined. Each is a link in an endless chain. '*Our* Father'! '*Thy* kingdom come'—not *my* kingdom, *your* kingdom, *his* kingdom, *her* kingdom; but the kingdom which embraces all: where each gives thanks for all life's gifts to all God's creatures: where each prays for all: where each confesses the sins of the age as his own.

'For their sakes I sanctify myself'—such was the inmost motive and meaning (*Logos*) of the rationally-unsoundable high-priestly prayer in *Jn.* xvii. That is, *for their sakes*—never *for my sake*, save when He was being tempted, in the wilderness, at Caesarea Philippi, in the Garden of Gethsemane, and at other times and in other places of which the Gospels say nothing: after every such assault from the depths of man's common, inviolable and inescapable individuality there came the victory, 'Not as I will, but as thou wilt'; 'Get thee behind me, Satan: for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of men': so that He set His face as a flint to go to Jerusalem, knowing well that He must encounter life's last enemy there. 'I sanctify myself': that is, *I dedicate, I consecrate myself; I am self-dedicated to Thee, O Father, in Thy eternal purposes of Unity, Truth and Love for Thy whole creation.* 'That they also may be self-consecrated in truth.' Not that they may be self-obliterated, self-annihilated, self-absorbed in the Immeasurable All. For Pantheism is the worship of self expanded to the *n*th degree—of self cloaked by self-pity and by escape from inviolable individuality and untransferable duty. The smoke-screen of *Nirvana* is not the selflessness of Jesus who said to His disciples, 'In my Father's house are *many* mansions.'

Thus all the basic questions of this time meet in the phrase 'Corporate Prayer'—Individual and Society, Order and Freedom, Authority and Vision. Nor can men reach that integration—that transcendence—of these seeming opposites until they are willing to follow the way of Christ. The Divine Rule is a commonwealth of persons, not an aggregate of particles. Thus, uneasily and uncertainly, troubled modern followers of Christ seek in loyalty to the inmost criteria of His gospel to guide contending politicians and economists of the age: on the one hand, resisting every totalitarian assault on the individual and personal centres of the Divine Spirit's action in society; and on the other hand, furthering every effort to enlarge these individual and personal souls, each so dear to God, by awaking them to the meaning and call of the Kingdom of God. 'Freely ye have received, freely give.' 'Ye are the body of Christ.'

Thus the Cross is the heart of all true prayer. As men forget themselves, they find ourselves. 'Our' replaces 'my.' They do

not say 'This hand is mine, to win wages for myself'; but with the *Theologia Germanica*, 'I would fain be to the Eternal Goodness what his own hand is to a man.'

Pascal wrote: '"This is *my* dog," say children; "that sunny seat is *mine*." *There* is the beginning and type of the usurpation of the whole earth.' Jesus said: 'For their sakes I sanctify myself.' *There* is the beginning and type of the inheritance of the whole universe. For Compassion, Sympathy, Understanding of the Heart is of the final essence of Prayer. It is God's most intimate presence in the human soul. It is His Logos, His Deed, His Way, His Plan. It prophesies His Goal. Here it is expressed, not in the context of formal Christian Creed, but by a Persian voicing what is deeper than any and every Creed:

> He prayed, but to his prayer no answer came,
> And choked within him sank his ardour's flame.
> No more he prayed, no more the knee he bent,
> While round him darkened doubt and discontent;
> Till in his room one eve there shone a light
> And he beheld an angel-presence bright,
> Who said, 'O faint-heart, why hast thou resigned
> Praying, as though thy God were deaf and blind?'
> 'I prayed,' he said, 'but nothing won by prayer,
> Long disappointment has induced despair.'
> 'Fool!' cried the angel, 'every prayer of thine
> Of God's immense compassion was a sign;
> Each cry of thine, "O Lord!" itself contains
> The answer, "Here am I"; thy very pains,
> Ardour and love and longing and each tear
> Are His attraction, prove Him very near.'

The unknown writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* spoke of 'some better thing' in a commonwealth where the perfection of each member is attained only in the perfection of the whole society: 'apart from us' all predecessors and all successors cannot 'be made perfect.' The final meaning of History is that each has received, but only to give: has been enlightened, but only to enlighten: has been born from above, but only to assist at the birth — to be the mid-wife — of new-born children. 'Fellowship is heaven, and lack of fellowship is hell,' said William Morris.

This is the meaning — the final meaning — of all man's disorders. Indeed it is the meaning — the final meaning — of the whole history of all things visible and invisible, of all creatures great and small. It is Divine in Source, Divine in Way, Divine in Goal. Creation, Inspiration, Consummation are inseparable: as inseparable as 'Father,' 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' of orthodox definition. That is the inmost meaning of Paul's words, 'We know not how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit Himself maketh

intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered.' This, too, is the inmost meaning of Tennyson's pre-vision of what the frequently used and discussed word 'telepathy' seeks inadequately to declare:

> Star to star vibrates light, may soul to soul
> Strike thro' a finer element of her own?

Which things, if convincedly known, imaginatively embraced, co-operatively obeyed, will make 'possible' much now deemed 'impossible.' That is, to use philosophic language, the 'possible' is always the 'compossible' and the 'impossible' is always the 'non-compossible.' What men *can* do is inherent in what they are within the invisible framework of an indivisible universe, and all encompassed by Final Plan and Purpose of UNITY.

In closing this paper — which, I am well aware, says too much and also too little — I would be scriptural, direct, simple and practical: permitting myself the personal 'I' which in another context I have deplored.

Jesus said: 'If two of you shall agree on earth as touching any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven': 'For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.' This twofold saying seems so difficult; it encounters men's hard-baked, stubborn and materialistic 'impossibility.' For men think, mathematically, that one plus one equals two; forgetting, morally and spiritually, that two persons may be much more, and much less, than twice one; forgetting also the basic condition by which alone two persons become more than, instead of less than, twice one. The sum total of any company or congregation tells nothing of what it really *is*. Its spiritual reality depends not on its number but on its fellowship — a large number may be very evil or very good in potency. 'In my name,' said Jesus. In My spirit. In devotion to the Kingdom of God of which He was Incarnate expression. The self-centred petitions of two individuals seated or kneeling together are not the petitions of two corporately praying in His name. And if two can come thus to 'agree' as touching something they can ask and so receive, how much greater, and how much fuller and deeper, will be the realm of their requests when two becomes four, and four sixteen, and so to the seeming infinity of the mutually-dependent human family. Perfect agreement, of which Jesus spoke, is not the screen agreement among thieves, aggressors, exploiters, despoilers, conspirators, worldly-wise compromisers. Only the Kingdom of God in the hearts and

minds and wills of men and women makes this perfect agreement. They are then embraced in a Purpose transcending all separate human finite purposings. The Infinite, that is, the Perfect, has shaped them into a vessel for its use; has mined them into a channel for its healing and life-giving energies. Then — to come to the second part of the indivisible saying — when in this way, by this Mind, two or three have met together, His Spirit, the very Spirit of God, is in their very midst; as when He said on another occasion, 'the kingdom of God is within you' (*én mesō humōn* — the two translations, 'within you' and 'in the midst of you' together bring out the full and essential meaning).

What enlargement of men's minds, what purification of their hearts, what empowering of their wills, might thus come to each separate but dependent community, nation, ecclesia! That enlargement, purification, empowering, despairers say to-day, compassed as all are with immovable mountains and separated by raging seas, is impossible. It is not so, if enough men are both 'agreed' and 'met together' in His name.

But do many customarily meet together 'in His name'? Certainly members of His visible Church gather, using His name. Certainly they say at the end of many of their audible prayers 'through Jesus Christ our Lord.' But when, for one reason or another, corporate prayer is thwarted and limited by theological and ecclesiastical divisions—as at a recent assembly for European Union at the Hague — it is idle for men to declare to the world, and to themselves, that there has been a meeting together 'in His name.'

It is an old, unhappy, yet very modern story. Reminding the historian of such a conference on Unity which met at Thorn in Poland in 1644, convened by the Primate of Poland and attended by many representatives of the existing Christian Communions. It was to be called the '*Colloquium Charitativum*'; but, in the absence of corporate prayer 'in His name,' it came to be known as the '*Colloquium Irritativum*.' So 'this mountain' was not removed or cast into the obliterating sea.

Faith is necessary for such 'miracles.' And corporate prayer is Faith, in immediate and final action. As, also, it is Hope in action. As, pre-eminently, it is Love in action. The three Graces are one in all true Prayer.

It was when the early disciples of Jesus were met together, 'all with one accord in one place,' that such a signal outpouring of the Divine Spirit was vouchsafed as to merit the misnomer for that day, 'the birthday of the Christian Church.'

On the night prior to the Crucifixion, Jesus had promised the releasing of new energies to feeble and bewildered men asking 'in His name.' The coming of The Helper was conditioned by corporate prayer. 'And whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If ye shall ask anything in my name, that will I do. If ye love me, ye will keep my commandments. And I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Helper' (*Jn.* xiv, 13-16).

To pray in the name of Jesus is to pray as He prayed: with complete trust, obedience, love. Such prayer can never be individualistic, or centred on temporal ends of our self-engrossed choosing, or directed to any goal other than the Eternal Kingdom.

Those who would really confront His words and their inescapable meaning *must* remember — again in the Hebraic sense — the Cross to which the consecrated prayer of Jesus led *Him*. Such Prayer is the most costing experience known to men.

A LAYMAN'S READING

By John Rowland, B.Sc.

I THINK that there is sometimes a tendency in theological quarters to 'play down' the amount of serious reading which a reasonably intelligent layman is prepared to do. For that reason, among others, I have looked along my bookshelves to see what books I have read within a period of, say, two or three months and have thought important enough to keep. From this survey I purposely omit all fiction, and everything which may be regarded as mere entertainment. I deal only with the works of serious interest which I am sure I shall, ere long, read again. These are not, as will be seen, wholly theological works, though most of them have some theological implications.

I will not attempt to list the books in an order of what appears to me to be relative importance. It is impossible to correlate, for example, Dr. R. E. D. Clark's *The Universe: Plan or Accident?* (Paternoster Press; 6*s.*), which is a scientist's interesting attempt to unite science and religion, with M. P. Shiel's *Science, Life, and Literature* (Williams & Norgate; 10*s.* 6*d.*), which is a veteran novelist's last posthumous book, in whose pages he tries to set out the beliefs, theological and aesthetic, on which his life's work was founded. Yet both those books are important in their way, and both of them, I think, I shall read again one of these days.

Perhaps most impressive of all recent volumes is Hanns Lilje's *The Valley of the Shadow* (S.C.M. Press; 7*s.* 6*d.*), in which a German pastor, now occupying an honoured position in Germany, tells of his arrest and trial by the Gestapo in 1944. The earlier pages of the book, indeed, have something of the nightmare atmosphere which makes Kafka such a potent influence in the European novel of our time; something, too, of Arthur Koestler's *Darkness At Noon*.

And then there is a book published by the invaluable Penguin Books Ltd. This is Dr. C. J. Cadoux's posthumous *Life of Jesus*, which — without reaching the comparative scepticism of Renan — nevertheless attempts to portray the Jesus of history as realistically and as fully as the documents warrant. Here, too, there is a useful volume, *Verdict on Jesus*, by L. S. R. Badham (Williams & Norgate; 9*s.* 6*d.*), which is a critical examination of the claims that most people would regard as being the central facts of Christianity. Valuable, too, in this connection is Mr. Frank Powell's *The Trial of Jesus Christ* (Paternoster Press; 5*s.*), which gives an interpretation, largely legal, of the background of the trials of Jesus. The authenticity of the book is increased by the knowledge that Mr. Powell is a well-known Metropolitan Magistrate, and is therefore acquainted with much of the psychological basis of all trials.

More directly individual than any of these volumes is Mr. Jack Clemo's *Confession of a Rebel* (Chatto & Windus; 9*s.* 6*d.*), in which a young novelist of the present time (he was recently given an Atlantic Award) writes the story of his first thirty years of life and explains what has brought him from an early scepticism to what he regards as a twentieth-century variation on Calvinism.

On the more strictly scientific side there is Mr. Chapman Pincher's *Evolution* (Herbert Jenkins; 7*s.* 6*d.*), in which the scientific correspondent of a London daily paper gives an interesting and informative introduction to the theories of Darwin, in a form which can, I think, be appreciated even by those who have no scientific knowledge. More political is *Pilgrimage of Western Man*, by Stringfellow Barr (Gollancz; 7*s.* 6*d.*), an analysis, by an American historian, of the breakdown of mediaeval Catholicism, with the new suggestion that the great need for our time is to find some international authority which will replace the supernatural authority of the Vatican and which will mediate between the clashing ideologies of the East and West.

Perhaps the most stimulating of controversial books that I have read in the period I am trying to cover is the new edition of

Mr. Charles Duff's *This Human Nature* (Watts; 3*s.* 6*d.*). Mr. Duff is a sceptic; but he is a sceptic of the urbane, almost Voltairean type. This gives his discussion of the rôle of human nature in history a flavour of its own, and makes it attractive reading even to those who would most violently disagree with much that he has to say.

Altogether lighter, but still readable and in some respects thought-provoking, is *London-Bodmin*, by J. C. Trewin and H. J. Willmott (Westaway Books; 10*s.* 6*d.*), in which a Cornish journalist living in London and an Englishman from the Home Counties living in Cornwall, discuss many of the less controversial issues of the day.

It will be seen that my reading has been very varied. It even extends to Sir Arthur Keith's massive *Autobiography* (Watts; 21*s.*), though that is a book which I shall *not* read again, mainly because Sir Arthur's attempt to relate his theory of evolution to an attitude to international affairs that I hold to be mistaken and evil in its effects is one of the most infuriating things that have come my way for many a long year.

I am, it will be observed, not a systematic reader. I read all kinds of books. Some of those mentioned here have been read for the first time out of a sense of duty (because I have been asked to review them somewhere); some of them have been read because I felt sure that I should derive some pleasure from them. But all of them have, I think done something to make my mind settle in its beliefs, as these are slowly crystallizing.

And that, I think, is the important thing. The man whose mind is closed to new ideas is not of much use to his fellow-men. The man who has formed his own philosophy (perhaps, even, his own theology) for himself, and who brings to his reading not an open mind — that too often means an empty mind! — but a mind alert to pick up knowledge of value from whatever source may offer itself, is the man who may help his neighbours. For instance, I read with much appreciation, though frequent disagreement on what I think were comparatively minor points, Dr. A. R. Vidler's *Christian Belief* (S.C.M. Press; 10*s.* 6*d.*). Yet the most striking memory that I have retained from that book is an apposite quotation from James Martineau:

> 'Whatever unity may yet arise in Christendom will be no less different from anything we have yet known than the factory from the monastery, the locomotive from the packhorse, or the *Times* newspaper from the illuminated manuscript.'

Now, perhaps, the reason for these apparently random jottings may be becoming manifest to the reader. I think that the reading

f a person with a serious trend of thought, not interested only in ntertainment (though, as I have indicated, I have my entertain- ng reading as well; yet this is not the place to describe it), may ave some lessons for others with similar tastes and interests. To ecommend books unless they be accepted classics is a dangerous rocedure, I have found. But to jot down notes on books read in uch a way as to give other readers some sort of impression of hat the books try to do is a useful function, I hope.

It will be observed that I have not mentioned any books specifically dealing, in a Modernist way, with the cause for which *The Modern Churchman* stands. This is not with any deliberate intent. t is merely that I hold that the rational theologian, from whatever school of thought, must find his material everywhere, and not merely in the propagandist publications of the branch in which e himself believes. Rationalists (of the Rationalist Press Association kind) would, of the books I have discussed here, find full agreement with one only — Mr. Charles Duff's *This Human Nature*; I do not know that Unitarians or Modernist members of the Church of England would agree whole-heartedly with any of the books which I have mentioned. Yet I think that most of those of generally liberal opinions on theology would find interest, importance, and value in every book which I have retained in my memory long enough to write its title, author, and other details here.

BOOK REVIEWS

DR. C. J. WRIGHT ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL

Dr. C. J. Wright's first book on the Fourth Gospel was published in 1933 with the title *St. John, The Meaning and Message of the Fourth Gospel.* He continued to give much thought to the subject, the fruit of which was seen in the section on the Fourth Gospel which he contributed to that much appreciated work *The Mission and Message of Jesus,* in which he combined with Dr. Manson and Dr. Major. This section has been re-written and expanded in the present volume.[1] Dr. Wright has kept two questions steadily before him: *what did the Gospel mean to the evangelist himself?* and *what should it mean to men and women to-day?* The reader, therefore, is given a kind of pulpit exposition with careful scholarship behind it.

Dr. Wright accepts the view that 'the beloved disciple' was John the son of Zebedee, referred to under this designation by a devoted follower, the author of the Fourth Gospel, John, the Elder of Ephesus. The latter John, originally a Palestinian Jew, had, as a young man, some contact with Jesus Himself. The reasons for this conclusion are set out clearly and persuasively.

[1] *Jesus, the Revelation of God,* by C. J. Wright. (Hodder & Stoughton; 1950; 25/-.)

The purpose of the evangelist is to recall the Church of his day (before the end of the first century) to the mind and message of Jesus. His gospel presupposes a knowledge of the Synoptic gospels (more plainly of *Mark* and *Luke* than of *Matthew*) and gives us not 'precise Biography' but 'essential Biography.'

Dr. Wright pleads for what he calls 'psychological' exegesis of the Gospel. The writer had an 'intuitive, mystical and artistic mind, he wrote when he saw — and not till he saw. What he wrote sprang out of his meditations.' He will 'begin a narrative and omit to finish it: as in the story of Nicodemus, who, he tells us, came to Jesus by night, with what issue to the inquirer he leaves us to guess; or as in the story of the Greeks who came seeking to see Jesus—which is the only thing the Evangelist has to say about them.' 'The phrase "after these things," or "after this," very probably marks a sequence in the author's own mental reconstruction, or construction; not a sequence in the narrated events themselves.'

Further, the author had 'a dramatic mind' and 'an allegorising mind'; and Dr. Wright throughout his commentary is on the look out for drama and allegory. Thus he points out that the witness of John the Baptist to Christ in the first chapter is given a setting of impressive dramatic fitness. 'This setting may have some historical tradition behind it: but the way in which it is staged — Sadducees and Pharisees curiously combined, the manner in which their questions are put, reflecting the popular Messianic expectations of the day — and the emphatic threefold denial by John that he is the Messiah (v. 20), clearly reveal the dramatising mind of the author.'

Dr. Wright's suggestive treatment of the narrative of the miracle at Cana is a good example of his psychological method. Here the main intention of the evangelist was to illustrate the transformation which Jesus achieves in His disciples. He had heard from John the Apostle 'of a certain wedding which Jesus had attended, in which He shared, and added to, the joys and festivities of the occasion.' On the basis of this historical tradition he pondered some of the sayings of Jesus with which he was familiar — e.g. 'the new wine in old bottles' (*Mark* ii, 22); and finally 'out of his meditations there comes this story.'

There can, indeed, be little doubt that whatever historical tradition may or may not lie behind narratives like the healing of the man at the Pool of Bethesda, the healing of the man born blind, or the raising of Lazarus, the writer has constructed them as allegories. Indeed, they are often double allegories: that is to say they represent allegorically the effect of the coming of Christ both upon the nation and the world and also upon the individual person.

The very figures given indicate what is in the evangelist's mind. The five husbands of the woman of Samaria must surely reflect *II Kings* xvii, 30-31— the five bodies of colonists who established the worship of their deities in Samaria. The thirty and eight years of the sufferings of the man healed at Bethesda are reminiscent of *Deut.* ii, 14, where the time taken by the Israelites in the wilderness between Kadesh-barnea and the brook Zared is given as thirty-eight years. As to the most famous number of all, the hundred and fifty and three fishes of *John* xxi, 11, Dr. Wright decides that the most likely of all the suggestions is that mentioned by Jerome, who, commenting on *Ezekiel* xlvii, 10, says that according to natural historians there are 153 known species of fish.

Dr. Wright follows Westcott and Lightfoot in attributing this chapter (xxi) to the evangelist himself. Here, and also with regard to the alleged

transpositions of certain sections of the gospel, Dr. Wright stoutly adheres to the manuscript evidence. The psychology of the evangelist being what it is, we cannot expect him to follow what we naturally regard as the logical order.

In this matter and throughout his book Dr. Wright maintains a consistent attitude which appeals to the readers' commonsense and steadily avoids far-fetched and cranky notions. On the other hand, he does not sufficiently allow for the Hellenistic influence which appears, for example, in the Johannine conception of the *logos*, which plainly belongs, not to rabbinic Judaism, but to Hellenistic philosophy.

Dr. Wright's style is florid, but he has unbounded admiration for the evangelist who 'with an overmastering insight into the inexhaustible truth as it was in Jesus,' produced 'the sublimest book ever written.' And those who are patient and receptive will find a study of this commentary illuminating and rewarding.

When all is said, the Gospel remains a literary and historical mystery. It rises into rare heights of shining mysticism and it descends to arid rabbinic controversial dialogue. Those who desire to see for themselves the Jesus of factual history must first turn to *St. Mark* and then to the other two Synoptic Gospels. Thus, and only thus, will they be prepared to advance to the Fourth Evangelist's painting of the effect in time and space of the glorious manifestation of the Eternal Lord.

J. W. Hunkin

THE LAST OF THE LATIN APOLOGISTS*

Such is Mr. Blakeney's description of Lactantius. It is not inappropriate, for Lactantius lived on into the times of Christian freedom, when there was no longer need for apologies in the old sense of the term. Doubtless his works in their present form were issued in these happier days, but their tone bears witness to the age only just past, when Christians lived and wrote under the shadow of death.

The reading of the Church Fathers is always a profitable exercise, and particularly so in the case of the Ante-Nicenes, who wrote not complacent philosophical treatises but defences against a capital charge in the law courts. If their faith was unjustified they lost both this world and also the world to come. This alone would entitle them to be treated with respect. We need not take them, or a selected few of them, as inspired men who could interpret the faith or expound the Scriptures in an authoritative manner for the docile acceptance of ages to come. But they are certainly witnesses, in the early and formative days of the Church's life, to the clear perception and intellectual vigour with which Christians presented their religion to a hostile world. Their writings are marked by a solidarity and strong rationality which contrasts favourably with all but the best of modern apologies. They were composed to last, and their authors seem to have expected that they would last. We, with longer experience and far greater knowledge, must approach them critically; but criticism means examination and not contempt, and the student who reads in the right spirit can hardly fail to gain from them a broader foundation for his faith. We may hope that Mr. Blakeney's wish may be fulfilled, that his little treatise will be found useful for study in theological colleges.

* Lactantius' *Epitome of the Divine Institutes*, edited and translated with a Commentary by E. H. Blakeney. (S.P.C.K., 1949; 11/-.)

The great work of Lactantius is the *Divine Institutes*. It may be a comfort to present-day writers of lengthy treatises to learn that, some time after he had written the *Institutes*, his brother asked for an abbreviated version. Lactantius complied with the request, although he felt, quite mistakenly I am sure, that the *Epitome* would be *brevitate minus clarum*. It is in fact an extremely lucid account of the Christian faith as Lactantius saw it, against the background of the pagan religions which were all that his world had left to it and which were plainly inadequate to human needs, either morally, spiritually or intellectually. Christianity won the struggle on its merits, as it always will win if those merits are presented in their simple purity. The positive points which emerge from a reading of these Latin apologies are, first, an insistence on the Unity of God as against current polytheism; secondly, a claim that God had visited His people in the person of Jesus Christ, and that henceforth men must see God as Jesus had revealed Him; thirdly, that Christians must take their standard of morality from Jesus and not be satisfied with anything lower; and lastly, that happy and dutiful as they must be on earth they are not to expect final rewards or satisfactions here. Lactantius is the last of four North African rhetoricians who became Christians in or closely around the third century, Tertullian, Cyprian and Arnobius (who was almost a contemporary) being the others. Though differing widely in ability and religious insight they form a remarkable group of men who were drawn to Christianity by the good lives of Christians and their steadfast bearing under persecution. Lactantius betrays in a number of passages his abhorrence of the persecutors, who not only killed their victims but first tortured them. His other work, *How the Persecutors Died*, whatever its historical merits may be, is a moving testimony to the revolt of the human spirit against cruelty.

Mr. Blakeney supplies his readers with a text, translation and commentary. For the text he has made full use of Brandt, the best modern authority. The commentary gives numerous references to Cicero, the Stoics and Plato, so that the reader who desires more information can easily find it. The translation is a competent piece of work, combining freedom with fidelity to the original. Many ingenious turns of expression help to make it easy and pleasant reading. A few passages might be reconsidered when the book is reprinted. In Chapter 30 (trans. p. 79 middle) should we not read, 'Philosophy is not even a devotion to wisdom, because it never comprehends wisdom,' rather than 'not even philosophy . . .'? The argument is verbal and not substantial, but it seems clearly to read this way. In Chapter 33 (p. 81, last line) 'the good' should be 'this good.' In Chapter 52 (p. 99 bottom) should not 'neither death nor slavery' read 'either death or slavery, but no more torture . . .'?

Those who study an author often find themselves coming to regard him as a friend. Mr. Blakeney has clearly done so with Lactantius. For he ends his translation with an Ode based upon Jerome's praise of Lactantius as 'a stream of Ciceronian eloquence.' Here are the closing lines:

> Thanks for thy message; it has power to wake
> A salutary joy, a hope serene
> Tho' touched with mortal warning, while we tread
> The appointed path of life — made lovelier
> By one great Light that breaks thro' clouded days,
> Far-shining from the Paradise of God.

G. W. BUTTERWORTH

THE CHRONIC INVALID*

It is not easy for a reviewer, who has never been ill, to enter whole-heartedly and with understanding into the mind and thought of one who for thirty years had never been well. It is somewhat like a clodhopper, enjoying rude health, wandering round the ward of a hospital wondeirng why it is that so many people are suffering in a world that is so gloriously fresh and vigorous.

The writer, who is familiar with the work of Adler, came to realise that her ill health, chronic and serious as it was, was due not to physical causes but to maladjustment, to mental stresses and strains, and through a refusal to accept the responsibility that has to be taken by everyone who wants to live a normal life.

Medical people now reluctantly admit that a great many of the serious physical ailments which persist in spite of all the skilled attention the patients receive are due to mental causes; and these causes going back very often to early years and lodged, as they are, in the unconscious, are most difficult of access.

In this particular case the patient recalls an illness which she had at the age of two when she experienced not only suffering and pain, but what was even more important, the loving care and attention of her parents and, in fact, of all the household.

According to Freudian doctrine there is a deep yearning in everyone to go back to the period in infancy when we were nourished, protected and kept snug and warm by the loving care and attention of our mothers. The sick bed approximates to that early state of infancy. There is the mother herself or her substitute — the nurse, there is the father or the father substitute — the doctor, and then there is that deep concern clearly shown on the face of our relatives when we are ill and the general air of much activity and anxiety on our behalf. No effort is required on our part. We obey orders, that is all. Life is regulated and time is given for reflection and we are obviously very important persons. If we get better then we have to partake in the common struggle, lose ourselves in the storm and stress of life, and this unconsciously we resist because in the unconscious there is this urge towards this helpless and yet most comfortable, most irresponsible and most happy period of infancy.

If this instinctive urge then is present in everyone, why don't we all adopt the rôle of sickness by which it can best find expression and satisfaction. Fortunately there are other instinctive drives within the unconscious which enable us to escape from that No Man's Land between life and death, namely the bed of chronic illness. There is the strong urge to belong to society and not to be isolated from it and to become significant in that society by the quality of the contribution we make towards its strength and its welfare. Adler further asserts that our style of life is acquired in the early years and this is confirmed in this case of the chronic invalid whose illness at the age of two satisfied the craving for protective care which became dominant but left the normally stronger desire unexpressed and therefore dormant.

Now the patient became aware of this and realised that the course she was pursuing was one of self-indulgence and certainly not in accord with her high Christian principles. The problem was how to release this pent-up force which would then flow freely along accepted channels and free her from the thraldom of chronic invalidism.

The book she has written is an account of the manner by which she won her way to victory over her enemy. She based her method on a law, viz. — If any

* *The Chronic Invalid*, by Phyllis A. Baxter. (Longmans, 1949; 6/6.)

one requires opportunities and scope, let him first of all be clear-minded about the kind of opportunity and scope he requires. Let him then desire intensely and let him implicitly believe that all that is necessary is on the way.

I confess that this sounds rather hazy and intangible to me. What it means is probably that if we want to get well, we must formulate a plan by which we eliminate fear, project our imagination forward and exercise our will in order to reach the goal which we have envisaged.

The writer suggests that sickness or the defective functioning of the organs in the body, the disorders of the glands and the inability of the body to resist disease is merely the reflection of and a response to the disordered state of the mind. In other words a healthy mind is not dependent on a healthy body, but a healthy body is dependent on a healthy mind.

Everyone is familiar with the Adlerian doctrine which asserts that a physical handicap is very often the means by which we win distinction. In this case it would seem that the frailty of body and the suffering the author endured has produced a delicacy of thought which has found expression in the refinement of language and in the poetical diction which characterises the whole book.

L. FORSTER

ACCRETIONS TO THE LITURGY*

This revised and enlarged edition of the study published by Mr. Daniel in 1937 is of considerable interest, both for the liturgist and the general theological reader. For the liturgist, its chief value lies in the list of Jacobite (monophysite) liturgical books, whether in print, MS. or translations from the Syriac (apparently now increased in number to 146 for the Eucharist and 19 for Baptism); in the list of extant Jacobite anaphoras (now increased to 88 in number); in the numerous photographic plates of MSS. and in the quotations. For the general theological reader, the interest lies in following the development of the main ideas now connected with the mass, which are proved by the writer's quotations to be accretions over a period of centuries. Invocations of Saints; passages expressing mediatorial priesthood; ideas of conversion of the elements by an epiclesis of the Holy Spirit upon them; prayers concerning propitiatory sacrifice and the forgiveness wrought by it—all these are shown, by the method of comparing later with earlier liturgies, to have been added gradually, at the expense of a simpler earlier tradition which stressed the enrichment of the personal Christian life through devout partaking of bread and wine over which had been said a prayer of thanksgiving. Thus, the implicit conclusion to be derived from this book is that a great liturgical reform is needed if we would be faithful to the original Eucharistic scheme; and the first edition received a good deal of unfavourable criticism at the hands of those who are hostile to such reform. To this second edition, therefore, Mr. Daniel adds a preface in which he emphasises that the actual subject of his book is not the reform of the liturgy and that his critics should have proved his evidence unsound instead of veering away from it into the realm of doctrinal controversy. Mr. Daniel claims, in fact, that his book is to be regarded strictly as a scientific study of the growth of liturgies. Certainly he makes use of the scholarly and objective method. The Jacobite liturgies (in translation) are the main ones studied; and in the first chapter it is pointed out that while there is a strong family resemblance among them,

* *A Critical Study of Primitive Liturgies, especially that of St. James*, by K. N. Daniel. (Printed at the T.A.M. Press, Tiruvalla. Apply for copies to the author, S. C. Seminary, Tiruvalla, Travancore, S. India; Price Rs. 8.)

due to their being derived from the original so-called Liturgy of St. James, there is also a great variety of forms still in use. This is due to the fact that none of the extant anaphoras was ordered or sanctioned by a patriarchal order or the decision of a council, each anaphora being drawn up by a particular divine. Even to-day an influential *malpan* (a priest who is a teacher of theology and Syriac) may compile a liturgy and ask his disciples to use it. Mr. Daniel rightly points out that a similar freedom once existed generally in the Church and that it actually lingered on in the Church of Rome — as far as details were concerned — until the seventeenth century.

In Chapters II and III the Liturgy of St. James, in its Greek and Syriac forms, is traced back through various stages (all given also in translation) to a conjectured common form as this must have existed before the Jacobites separated from the Orthodox about 550 A.D. And in Chapter XVI (which appears only in this second edition of the book), an attempt is made to reconstruct the liturgy in the form in which it was originally composed for Christians in Jerusalem and used later in Antioch — by Theodore of Mopsuestia, for example, in the fifth century. Mr. Daniel also gives us what he judges to be an approximate sixth century form of the Coptic (Jacobite) Liturgy of St. Mark now used in Egypt.

From this point onwards, the author examines the various accretions mentioned above, and shows how they violate the spirit of the earlier eucharistic forms. It is not possible here to discuss in detail all the points brought forward. The method and spirit of the author's researches commend themselves to the impartial student, but his arguments are not always easy to follow, and one could wish that his study of the family of liturgies derived from the Liturgy of St. James had been brought into touch with other studies of the same character — especially with Lietzmann's masterly work *Messe und Herrenmahl* (Mass and Lord's Supper). The latter appeared in 1926, quickly went out of print however, and may not have reached India, whilst the English translation is still delayed from publication by difficulties in the printing trade. From Lietzmann Mr. Daniel would have found some support; but also much evidence that might often have made him pause — particularly concerning his greatly-emphasised point that the Holy Spirit was at first invoked upon the worshippers, and only at a later date came to be invoked upon the bread and wine. Lietzmann, in showing that all the Syro-Byzantine liturgies, including the Liturgy of St. James, have been derived from the liturgy of *Apostolic Constitutions* (Book VIII), makes it clear that the earliest form of *epiclesis* was in respect of the elements. This, however, is not to say that the earliest eucharist was not focussed upon communion instead of sacrifice.

Mr. Daniel is presumably an Indian scholar; and it is of great importance that there should be scientifically-trained liturgists in India, as elsewhere, at this moment of major crisis in the Church's history. Most important of all is it that these studies should be integrated with New Testament critical studies, for the process of liturgical accretion set in very quickly and we need to know what are the ideas by which the developments should have been (and should still be) controlled. Mr. Daniel is attracted by the belief that the Jewish grace, or thanksgiving over food, represents the norm of the proper development of the eucharistic prayer, since at the Last Supper Jesus Himself is said to have given thanks. But is there not something of sacrificial import in the reported formula of Institution? Ultimately, the problem revolves upon this formula — the way in which it was used or not used in the early Liturgies, and its relation to the mind of Jesus studied as a whole.

R. D. RICHARDSON

POSITIVE PREACHING AND THE MODERN MIND*

P. T. Forsyth, a Congregational scholar and divine of a generation ago is now enjoying a well-deserved revival. A number of his books have recently been re-issued, and they reveal a modern-minded man who was well ahead of his time. His lectures, *Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind,* were delivered at Yale to a post-graduate audience of students for the Ministry. The book was first published in 1907. A second edition followed in 1909, and now comes the third edition forty years later. It is a tribute to the modernity of his teaching that these lectures still repay study, and that the author is saying in them many of the things which we are apt to regard as especially modern to-day.

The lectures were abbreviated for delivery and might well have been published in the shorter form. There is much repetition, and the argument, like many sermons, is often unnecessarily prolonged. But there is passion and ardour as well as theological insight, and those who absorb the fervent message of this book will themselves preach with greater power.

Forsyth's non-comformist background is evident throughout. For him the sermon is an essential part of worship; it is the Church confessing its faith. 'The sermon has always been regarded as an integral part of the service by a Protestantism which knew what it was about. It is the world of the Gospel returning in confession to God who gave it. It is addressed to man indeed, but in truth it is offered to God. Addressed to men but offered to God—that is the true genius of preaching.' (p. 66). There is no attempt to hold the balance, as in the English Church, between word and sacrament. 'The great, the fundamental sacrament, is the sacrament of the word, and this is the sacrament which gives value to all others. Christianity stands or falls by its preaching.'

The preacher to-day addresses those who do not know their Bible and one of his tasks is to regain their interest in it. Forsyth accepted the Biblical criticism of his day and would not have the preacher ignore it, but he was unduly hesitant about making it known from the pulpit, and he draws too sharp a distinction between the scholar and the preacher.

> 'The minister's conscience is not scientific but pastoral. For this purpose he must often exercise a discreet reserve as to scientific truth in the interest of higher truth or truth on the whole . . . The thinker and the scholar have a freedom, and even a duty which do not belong to the pastor who has a cure of souls. The savant may owe to the public or the lecturer to his class what the preacher does not owe to his charge.' (pp. 73-4).

Though the scholar and the preacher have different functions and the scholar may be no preacher, the preacher to-day cannot afford to be no scholar. Forsyth's uneasy distinction would be more acceptable if, as the author seems to assume, the congregations who heard sermons were also attending lectures and Bible classes. This, however, is very rarely the case and the sermon is the only opportunity which most pastors have of educating their people in the modern view of the Bible. Forsyth is wiser in a later passage, page 112.

> We must meet criticism of the Bible with a hospitable face. We have learned much from it, and we have much to learn. We preachers, especially, must realise how it has rediscovered the Bible, as Luther rediscovered the Gospel. We must use all wise and tender means to give

* *Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind,* by P. T. Forsyth. (Independent Press, 1949; 10s. 6d.)

our people the results of that discovery, and to make the Bible for them the real historic and living book which it has so widely ceased to be.'

Positive preaching for Forsyth is the opposite of liberal preaching, and one chapter is devoted to an attack on liberal theology. Here, as so often, Forsyth is right in what he affirms and wrong in what he denies. His own definitions reveal how inadequate was his conception of a liberal theology. (p. 143).

> 'By liberalism I mean the theology that begins with some rational canon of life or nature to which Chistianity has to be cut down or enlarged (as the case may be); while by a modern positivity I mean a theology that begins with God's gift of a super-logical revelation in Christ's historic person and cross, whose object was not to adjust a contradiction but to resolve a crisis and save a situation of the human soul. For positive theology Christ is the object of faith; for liberal, He is but its first and greatest subject, the agent of a faith directed elsewhere than on Him. It is really an infinite indifference, for only one side can be true.' (p. 143).

From these definitions it is an easy matter to demonstrate the superior nature of the outlook Forsyth approves to that which he disdains. But the world of difference between the apparently opposed views disappears when a truer conception of liberal theology is held and when it is wedded to the positive so that the twain become one flesh. The distinction between positive and liberal is a false one; the preacher to-day must be positive and liberal or he is nothing.

W. G. Fallows

THE RATIONALIST PRESS*

This record of the inception, development and achievements of the R.P.A. is of interest to all who are concerned for freedom of thought in the sphere of religion, and amongst these are to be reckoned persons who are friendly to religion no less than those who may be hostile to it. For freedom of thought is as essential for progress in religion as it is in any other sphere of human activity. Many people who would be reluctant to describe themselves as secularists are thus interested in and give their support to the R.P.A. as a notable opponent of bigotry, ignorance and superstition.

> 'Although the R.P.A. has provided opportunities for many Rationalists to expound their philosophies, it has never committed itself, as an Association, to any schedule of beliefs. Herein has lain the secret of its vitality, its progressiveness, its unity. Its various writers are at one only in their method of thought, and their readers are invited, not to accept a series of conclusions as embodying a new orthodoxy, but to develop their own conception of the nature of the universe and man by acquiring knowledge and by the disciplined use of knowledge.'

A most useful part of the Association's activities has been the issue of cheap reprints of notable works. It is interesting to read that the first negotiations for this series were conducted with Messrs. Macmillan in connection with T. H. Huxley's *Essays and Lectures*. Sir Frederic Macmillan even consenting to the book's appearance with the joint imprint of his firm and that of the R.P.A., which act of goodwill meant much to the Association at the time. Other works issued in this popular series were Matthew

* *The Story of the R.P.A.*, by A. Gowans Whyte. (Watts, 5s.)

Arnold's *Literature and Dogma*, Lecky's *European Morals*, Lea's *Sacerdotal Celibacy*, and Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*.

One 'scoop' achieved by the R.P.A. was the publication in 1909 of McCabe's *The Martyrdom of Ferrer*, a shilling volume of 96 pages written, printed and published within a month of Ferrer's execution. Ferrer's activities in educational and other fields had incurred the displeasure of the Roman Church; but within a month 10,000 copies of the book were sold.

Another most useful enterprise was the issue of a number of volumes in The Thinker's Library concerned with Science, History, Philosophy and Psychology. After the General Election of 1945 the B.B.C. took the opportunity of circularising the members of both Houses of Parliament with a statement of the case for extending freedom of broadcast discussion to religion and cognate subjects, with the result that in due course the B.B.C. initiated a series of more or less experimental discussions on religion, in which leading Rationalists took part. J.C.H.

LIBERALISM ON THE OFFENSIVE*

It is said that Hitler was wont to declare that if a lie was only big enough, repeated often enough, and with enough emphasis, it would be believed. This is, of course, the principle of modern advertising. It is understood thoroughly well by many of the most successful apologists for ecclesiastical orthodoxy. The line taken is that what they term humanism is the primary heresy, that it is really intellectually, morally and spiritually bankrupt, that we are now living on the spiritual capital of pre-Renaissance Catholicism, that what is good and humane in our liberalism and democracy is due to a Catholic basis now repudiated, that, in a word, we are busy sawing off the branch on which we sit. That humanism is the enemy, and that humanism is bankrupt is the oft-repeated slogan, dinned into our ears with an almost Hitlerian scream, the object being to put us into a panic. Either we must return to traditionalism and Romanism or go over the precipice into chaos and communism; it is a matter of *sauve qui peut*.

It is refreshing to read a sane counterblast to all this neurotic and reactionary nonsense in Mr. R. C. Churchill's urbane and ironic chapters, for it is really about time that something sensible was written upon this topic. One gets tired of the wearisome propaganda all pitched in the same note.

'"High-minded Victorian agnostics," says Mr. Lunn sadly, "living on the capital of the Christian tradition . . ." "Liberal idealism," groans Christopher Dawson: "merely an unsubstantial shadow projected from the religion of the past . . ." Several pages could be filled with remarks like these by Catholics, all tending to the curious conclusion that, as liberalism and agnosticism are based mainly (in Europe) on Christianity, therefore they have no value at all.'

What does it all amount to when we are told that, humanism, liberal idealism and democracy are the fruits of Catholic Christianity? It is really nothing but an assertion of the evolution of ideas, of the normal and natural development of a culture. Why should humanism and liberal idealism wither away because the exponents of those standpoints do not see their way to return to the thirteenth century or to subscribe to the decrees of the Council of Trent? Would such a 'return' act as a tonic to liberalism, democracy and so on? Human thought does not thus return on itself: to learn is hard, but to unlearn is still harder. After all, Catholic Christianity itself is based on a number of pre-Christian beliefs. But will Catholics consent to go back to

* *Disagreements*, by R. C. Churchill. (Secker & Warburg; 12s. 6d.)

Moses (and stay there) or to Persian mythology, or to Philo's mixture of Scripture and Plato? To live 'on the capital of Christianity' as liberal idealists are taunted for doing, is no different from Catholics living on the capital of the Classical culture, the Hebrew culture, and so on. We all live on the capital of the past, which is our common heritage; the only difference is that the humanists try to add to it whereas the Catholics do not except in the form of superstitious accretions.

Another line of apologetic is to say that the rejection of Catholicism leads to the totalitarian State. Admittedly, as Maritain and Christopher Dawson point out, we owe a large part of our repugnance to totalitarian methods to Christianity. 'But we need to ask: What *kind* of Christianity? Certainly not Catholicism when it was in undisputed power.' The intolerance of the Marxist fanatic is nothing new.

> 'It is precisely that age-old combination of enthusiasm, ignorance and conceit which produced the Inquisition and the Wars of Religion, and whose prime enemy is the tolerant, exploring, liberal mind.
>
> 'Every evil of modern totalitarian systems has been copied from similar techniques used in the pre-liberal past by clerical or military despotisms.'

Mr. Churchill is somewhat critical of the methods by which the Church of England is attempting to achieve 'the Conversion of England.'

> 'We find the Church Assembly anxious to sell the Gospel to the nation as one sells a pound of cheese, and advocating even more of the chummy talks of Mr. C. S. Lewis and the vulgarisation of the Bible of Miss Dorothy Sayers to combat the spread of agnostic ideas . . .
>
> 'The greatest cultural achievement of the Reformation was the provision of the Bible in the vulgar tongue. Miss Sayers, too, gives us a version in the common language of contemporary society, but not raised by art, rather pandering to the very worst elements in modern life and literature . . .
>
> 'If it were proposed to pull down Salisbury Cathedral and erect on its site a religious building composed of a mixture of Tudor garage, Odeon cinema and Woolworth's, the clergy would rightly protest; yet they not only received Miss Sayer's comparable reconstruction of the Gospels without protest, they warmly acclaimed it.'

The trouble is that when a Church weakens on the side of intellectual integrity, it weakens also on the side of taste and lapses into vulgarity as well as silliness. This is regrettable, for the Church of England, which stands so high, has a long way to fall. But falls can be, and often are, extremely rapid. H.P.M.

F. D. MAURICE TO WILLIAM TEMPLE

The movement known as Christian Socialism is important alike to the student of the theology and of the sociology of the past hundred years. Mr. Maurice Reckitt's *Maurice to Temple* [1] is an able survey of the period and the keen sympathy which he feels for his subject makes his treatment of it more interesting without its becoming unduly partial.

It is natural that Maurice should receive first place in such a study though it was a young barrister of Lincoln's Inn, Mr. Reckitt tells us, J. M. Ludlow, who first inspired Maurice to see in the social problems of the day deep theological implications. Maurice, however, was by no means primarily a social reformer; he was by his own confession a theologian, 'a theologian,'

[1] *Maurice to Temple*, by Maurice B. Reckitt. (Faber & Faber, 1947; 16/-.)

says Mr. Reckitt, 'a prophet, and perhaps a saint.' (*Maurice to Temple*, p. 19.)

> 'When we look to Maurice as a Christian Socialist, we should see him, as it were, as an iceberg where the socialism . . . is represented by the mass that towers above the water-line but is itself supported by the far vaster substructure which we do not see.' (p. 20.)

The subsequent history of the movement seems to show that it was the top of the iceberg only which Maurice's successors tended more and more to keep in mind. The emphasis shifted from theology to socialism, until we find Bishop Frazer of Manchester declaring that 'what was wanted was not so much to Christianise our Socialism as to Socialise our Christianity'—an antithesis which, as Mr. Reckitt shrewdly observes, 'is not free from that superficiality which is the special temptation of the episcopate.' (p. 98.) A few years later Canon Lewis Donaldson could declare roundly that 'Christianity is the religion of which Socialism is the practice'; and even Temple, as a young man, could write: 'The alternative stands before us, Socialism or Heresy.' (p. 151.)

The fact is, and *Maurice to Temple* shows it clearly, though it is scarcely the object of the author to do so, that the history of Christian Socialism is not the record of the Christianising of Socialism (which in spite of Bishop Frazer can hardly be reckoned either as accomplished or unnecessary) but to a far greater extent the record of the socialisation of the 'official mind' of the Church of England, especially, of course, through the influence of William Temple. The results of this progress are less encouraging than they might appear, and Mr. Reckitt is forced to admit that Maurice would find

> 'a Church of England having more slender links with the great mass of the nation to-day than even his unsanguine nature could have led him to foresee.' (p. 190.)

It is interesting and instructive to note that sixty years ago, when he was Vicar of Barking, Dr. Hensley Henson, severe and outspoken critic of Socialism though he was, could none the less fill his church to overflowing when once a year a thousand or more members of the local Trades Unions attended a special service of their own.[2] That such an event on such a scale should be virtually inconceivable to-day shows how far the tide of direct Christian influence and authority has receded since those days.

It is natural that Mr. Reckitt should call our attention to the social evils of a century ago, and to the Church's comparative indifference towards them. But he seeks to criticise with fairness and discrimination.

> 'It is easy,' he admits, 'for us now to see, and to say, how grievously the Church failed at this time; indeed it is generally even easier to be moral after the event than it is to be wise . . . It is arguable that the failures from which the Church always suffers most are the consequences not of the sins of bad men but of the shortcomings of good ones.' (p. 23.)

All the same, there are factors in the situation which he does not take into account. With no American Aid to fall back upon after the lengthy Napoleonic Wars which had involved a European Blockade, at least some degree of hardship was doubtless inevitable in the years that followed. This obviously does not go very far towards justifying or even excusing the manifest evils of the time, Child Labour, and suchlike, but it has further to be remembered that the Industrial Revolution was a thing without parallel or

[2] See H. Hensley Henson, *Light and Leaven*, p. 13 ff. (Methuen, 1897.)

recedent, and was such that it could scarcely be accomplished without much vil and suffering. Whether indeed there are evils in the very nature of ndustrialism which cannot be removed, whether the indifference of an ndustrial society to religion is itself one of these evils, are questions which ne Christian Socialist will scarcely consider, though it is interesting to note nat Kingsley, as Mr. Reckitt reveals, had more awareness of this possibility nan most of his contemporaries or followers.

> 'Kingsley, seemingly alone in the group (expressed) serious misgivings about industrialism. Maurice never seems to have concerned himself with the question . . . "Fortuitous, exceptional, transitional"—here is the kernel of Kingsley's diagnosis.' (p. 77 f.)

It is natural again that Mr. Reckitt should contrast the leaders of hristian Socialism with the rest of their fellow Churchmen who remained lent and unconcerned in the face of manifold social wrong. But it needs to e remembered that there were others besides the Christian Socialists who ere fully alive, a century ago, to failings of the Church, but who saw that ose failings went deeper than a lack of concern for social problems, and to hom the remedies of Christian Socialism were unacceptable.

One of them was the Bampton Lecturer for 1851, the year of the Great xhibition. It was not the bad conditions of the factory worker, or the ndifference of the wealthy prelate towards his lot, but more fundamentally,

> 'the diffusion of knowledge, in large communities, both widely and incompletely; the development of the powers of man, without, as some may apprehend, a proportionate addition of moral safeguards and restraints.'

hich led him

> 'to inquire with some anxiety, how far that religion, which we believe itself to be designed for universality is found to be actually capable of coupling itself with such an altered system, and of acting upon humanity, under conditions, wherein it has never before found itself.'

And whilst the Lecturer went on to speak of 'the strange phenomenon of odern socialism . . . this mockery of Christian principles . . . a distorted nd hideous semblance of the truth'; and to point out that

> 'it is not to be supposed that the Church should ally itself permanently with any one section, order, or class of the commonwealth; . . . that to moderate the clashing of interests between sections of the citizens, the peacemaker should . . . show himself a partisan'—

et he could condemn the Church, no less than any Socialist, for the lack of hristian brotherhood which it exhibited—

> 'Because the world heard but seldom from the mouth of the Christian preacher, of the essential equality of those whom God made of one flesh, of those who became all one in Christ Jesus; because seldom was the brother of low degree bidden to rejoice in that he is exalted, and the rich in that he is made low.' (H. B. Wilson, *Communion of Saints*, pp.2, 228-230.)

The Church's failure in this respect was, as Wilson realised, but the ymptom of a deeply rooted disease. One danger of Christian Socialism is nat it may confuse cause with effect and part with the whole. A more evealing though less obvious symptom of the Church's sickness was its ncreasing remoteness, not from the working folk but from the new light

which natural science and biblical criticism were thrusting upon the world in those days, and from the new outlook resulting from them. Had the Church grappled with this altered situation more courageously and in a more truth-seeking spirit, it might find itself to-day bound far more closely to 'the great mass of the nation' than any amount of Christian Socialism has succeeded in effecting.

D. L. SCOTT

THE RISK OF AN ATHEIST PRIMATE

*Church and State in England,'** by Dr. Garbett, Archbishop of York, comes in the class of popular, apologetic history. It is very readable, remarkably judicious in its selection of illustrative material and persuasive in its interpretation of it.

The larger purpose of the book is to give a reliable account of the relations of Church and State in England. Those relations began with the conversion of Ethelbert, King of Kent in 597, by Augustine, the emissary of Pope Gregory I. These varied relations lucidly and interestingly sketched by Dr. Garbett dispel the popular notion that the authority of the State over the Church originated with Henry VIII and that if it had not been for his adulterous marriage, the *Ecclesia Anglicana* would have remained in a state of blissful loyalty to the Papacy until the present day. Far from this being the case the relations of Church and State in England, at any rate from the time of the Norman conquest, have been a source of perpetual stress and strain in which the Papacy was the most disturbing factor. Perhaps that relationship is most truly understood as a marriage which, although on the whole beneficial to both parties, has not been ideally happy. Both parties had very large common interests and this made their marriage desirable, but they also had conflicting temperaments which at times produced strained relations.

The Church is a divine society and the State is a divine society and perfect co-operation demanded a larger measure of the divine spirit than either of the high contracting parties possess. Nevertheless, divorce or nullity in the form of Disestablishment which some discontented churchmen advocate to-day, must be most detrimental, spiritually and morally, to the English nation.

Here we come to the special purpose of Dr. Garbett's volume. He believes that the co-operation of Church and State can be improved and ought to be improved. To secure this he suggests five classes of reform:

(i) 'The Church must ask for some voice in the choice of its bishops.'
(ii) The Church must be able to revise its Prayer Book without a debate in Parliament.
(iii) The Church must be given authority to revise its canons without the consent and approval of Parliament.
(iv) The judgments of the ecclesiastical courts must not be challenged by appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
(v) The Church authorities must be granted greater powers in the re-organisation of its parochial system, endowments and administration. (p. 155 f.)

To secure such 'reforms' the Archbishop recognises that the Church authorities must be agreed and the laity, after being duly consulted, must be whole-hearted supporters of these 'reforms.' If, after these conditions have been fulfilled, Parliament should refuse consent to these 'reforms' then, Dr. Garbett writes, 'the Church would be compelled to ask for

* *Church and State in England*, by Cyril Garbett, Archbishop of York (Hodder and Stoughton, 1950; 15/-.)

Disestablishment with the full knowledge that some disendowment must accompany it.' (p. 157.)

This conclusion is reached half way through his book and in the remainder of the volume the Archbishop discusses at length the reasons for these reforms' and their specific value. It is at this point that many who have up till now been happy fellow-travellers with the Archbishop will begin to feel uneasy under his leadership.

The Archbishop's 'reforms' are all intended to give greater authority to our ecclesiastical organisations and to diminish almost to vanishing point the national authority over the Church's constitution and character.

When the Enabling Act was passed in 1919 it was judged by many that the utmost power which could be granted to the ecclesiastical authorities had been granted and that they were satisfied with these concessions to their demands. Had the ecclesiastical authorities at that time given the slightest indication to Parliament that they were going to make further demands for concessions as soon as the opportunity offered the Enabling Act would not have been passed. It seems to us that there is some lack in the Church's 'chastity of honour' (to use Edmund Burke's phrase) in her attempting to extort further concessions from Parliament especially in this time of terrible stress and strain in our political, economic and social life.

No sound case can be made out for the concessions the Archbishop demands and they can only carry weight either with those who are entirely ignorant of the existing situation or else by those who, like the Archbishop, know the existing situation quite well but are the adherents of an ecclesiastical idealism which can only be realised at the cost of Disestablishment but who believe that somehow ecclesiastical diplomacy is going to secure freedom from our existing establishment without the Church having to pay the cost. Let us look at these five demands:

I

'The Church must ask for some voice in the choice of its bishops.' It might be supposed that the Church has no voice in this matter. The Archbishop states however that 'there are five steps in the making of a diocesan bishop to-day,' *i.e.* (1) Nomination by the Prime Minister. (2) Approval by the Crown and the issue of the *Congé d'élire*. (3) Election by the Chapter of the Diocese. (4) The Confirmation by the Primate. (5) Consecration by the Primate and the Bishops of the Province.

Stages 3, 4 and 5 are entirely ecclesiastical and the refusal of the ecclesiastical authorities to perform them would prevent the Prime Minister's nominee being made a diocesan bishop. But in some exceptional case it might demand courage and strong force of conscientious conviction to do this on the part of our ecclesiastics but we have no right to assume that such qualities would be lacking to-day.

There is a well-known case in the despised Church life of the eighteenth century when such refusal was made effectively. Yet this is not by any means the whole of the Church's part in the appointment of bishops. There are at least five earlier stages for which the Church is entirely responsible in the making of the future bishop.

(1) His selection and training to be an ordinand for which the Archdeacon claims responsibility at his ordination.

(2) His ordination as a deacon by the Bishop.

(3) His securing a title for pastoral post and the pastoral training which ensues in the occupation of that post.

(4) His ordination as a priest by the Bishop.

(5) His institution to a benefice by the Bishop.

It is only from such a restricted group of clerics, not under 30 years of age (according to the canonical rule) that the Prime Minister is able to select the future bishop. But this is not all in the way of restriction imposed on the exercise of the Prime Minister's power: What about the Sovereign's approval? The 'great Marquis of Salisbury' said on one occasion that Queen Victoria thought that there were very few clergymen who ought to be made bishops. The Marquis himself took the same view but he added that the number of these clergymen on which both her Majesty and he were agreed was very small indeed.

There is a further restriction. It is highly improbable that any Prime Minister would select his episcopal candidate without first consulting the Primate. Mr. Lloyd George, no feeble dissenter, said he never made a selection without first consulting the Primate and this we believe to be the general practice. The Prime Minister is not under any obligation to act in accordance with the Archbishop's advice but he is no doubt influenced by it.

What larger share does Dr. Garbett desire for the Church in the making of a diocesan bishop? He fears lest the nomination should fall into the hands of an atheist Prime Minister and that the Prime Minister would misuse his office by nominating an atheist Primate. But how, under the existing system is he to secure an atheist for nomination?

II

The Church must be able to revise its Prayer Book without a debate in Parliament.

This demand is very unjust to Parliament since it was by debate in Parliament that the Church was saved from having the Deposited Book imposed upon it — a book which, although it had secured the approval of the Church Assembly, had neither the support of the clergy as a whole nor of the laity.

In the debate a member of the House of Commons asserted that, although not a churchman, he had consulted every incumbent in his Metropolitan Constituency and had found that not one of them favoured the authorisation of the Deposited Book.

The unrepresentative character of the House of Laymen is a scandal and we wish that our Church authorities would take effective action in this sphere.

III

The Church must be given authority to revise its canons without the consent and approval of Parliament.

Dr. Garbett here seems to evince a prophetic subconsciousness of the fate awaiting the Revised Book of Canons when presented to Parliament for authorisation.

IV

The judgment of the ecclesiastical courts must not be challenged by appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and there must be substituted a new court of appeal in which episcopal influence will be paramount. This is an amazing demand in view of the quality and inestimable value of the three greatest judgments of the judicial committee in certain notable church crises.

V

The Church authorities must be granted greater powers in the reorganisation of its parochial system, endowments and administration.

This demand is unnecessary. Since the passing of the Enabling Act in 1919 a great deal of Church legislation has been implemented in this sphere, possibly too much. We seem to need more evidence as to the effect of the operation of such legislation before the Church is granted greater power to enact further legislation in this sphere. H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

REINCARNATION

SIR,

Mr. Power is right in thinking that I had not seen the previous correspondence, and certainly there was nothing in his letter to show that he was criticising a letter 'by a reincarnationist,' or that the views he expressed were not his own.

He ends his second letter by asking why Western reincarnationists 'are so pleased about it' (as he phrases it), while to Buddhists reincarnation is 'the primeval curse.' I suggest that it is perfectly obvious why a Westerner accepting the idea of reincarnation might feel relief and release (not 'pleasure'). He can regard the possibility of the growth of the human spirit as proceeding over an infinite series of lives on earth, instead of being confined to one short span. Buddhism is, on the whole, a 'world-denying' religion with a completely different life-orientation from the Western, and there is no reason why the implication and significance of reincarnation should be the same for both.

Mr. Power prefaces his first letter by saying that it is 'commonsense which compels most Christian people to reject reincarnation.' Commonsense is surely a dangerous and incongruous criterion in such matters; and why is reincarnation more repugnant to it than the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection and the miracles?

REGINALD MERTON

Broom Hill House
Boars Hill, Oxford

SIR,

In answer to Mr. Power I only want to quote Thomas Huxley who is quoted in Kingsland's *Anthology of Mysticism* as saying, on the question of Transmigration, 'The plea of justification is not less plausible than others; and none but very hasty thinkers will reject it on the grounds of inherent absurdity. Like the doctrine of evolution itself, that of transmigration has its roots in the world of reality; and it may claim such support as the great argument from analogy is capable of supplying.' From Transmigration to Reincarnation is only to carry on the doctrine of Evolution still further, until in aeons to come, we have learned the lessons of life and then 'shall wing our way above the angels' and 'become that which entereth not the imagination.'

S. BRAY

Newark Mill House
Ripley, Surrey

THE RELIGIOUS VALUE OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

SIR,

I fear that few who believe (and they are very many) that 'our reasoning faculties and categories of thought' have been developed by natural selection from data supplied by our bodily senses, will be influenced by Mr. Hardwick's simple statement that such a position is untenable, but they would be influenced by a definite disproof, such as telepathy supplies.

In regard to his other point that a belief in God leading to a belief in survival has a religious value, but the reverse process has none, I should like to point out that for very many people a belief in survival is an essential preliminary to any belief in God. For looking only at this world, leads to the belief in some power working by a process of trial and error and caring nothing for those who fall in the process, whether human or of lower degree.

And it is this that is killing religion all over the world and must be countered.

I do not think that Mr. Hardwick can be seriously arguing that because *anything* can be used for either a good or evil purpose we should stop all advance in knowledge. Without the atom bomb all Europe would probably be now enslaved.

J. H. HUME-ROTHERY

SIR,

If anyone is persuaded that 'our reasoning faculties and categories of thought' have been 'developed by natural selection from data supplied by our bodily senses,' I do not imagine that they will change their views just because I regard them as untenable. But neither do I believe that any proof of the reality of telepathy will induce them to change those views, for they can easily say that telepathic faculties have been developed in precisely the same way.

It may be the case that 'for very many people a belief in survival is an essential preliminary to any belief in God,' but this does not hold universally, because there is no necessary and logical connection between the two beliefs. As a matter of fact the history of religion supplies many instances of belief in God quite apart from any belief in survival. The Sadducees, who had no belief in survival, believed in God, and in the Old Testament, belief in survival is largely non-existent. The Psalter is the most religious book in the O.T., and it is doubtful if the authors of any of the Psalms believed in personal immortality. There are only four possible references to such a belief according to Driver, and of these only one: 'When I wake up in thy likeness I shall be satisfied with it,' is a really convincing one.

It is only too true that 'looking only at this world leads to the belief in some power working by a process of trial and error and caring nothing for those who fall in the process, whether human or of lower degree.' But why should a belief in survival alter the situation? We have no means of knowing that conditions in a future life would be preferable to conditions in this life — possibly, for all we know (which is just nothing) they may be worse. Justice may not be done there any more, perhaps less, than it is here. My point is that belief in a future life is no adequate ground for belief in a God of justice and love. It might equally well be a ground for belief in the Devil. But belief in a God of Justice and Love carries with it as a corollary a 'sure and certain hope of everlasting life.' And that is the only sane, convincing and spiritual ground for such a belief.

J. C. HARDWICK

[We regret that owing to lack of space, we have been unable to publish a number of letters on the same themes.—Ed. *M.C.*].

IN *YOUR* MOMENT OF REMEMBRANCE

Please Remember Generously



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